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HOW DO WE UNDERSTAND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PEACE?

by

REBECCA L. SIMS

UNDER THE DIRECTION OF HENRY CAREY, PHD

ABSTRACT
This review essay provides a comprehensive roadmap of the international law of peace,
which has not been so presented in the International Law-International Relations literature
before. In Part 1 we review peace law as such, that is, where it is simply and directly mandated
in international law. In the second of the two parts, we depict international law that does not
mandate peace, but requires behavior that indirectly results in peace. In both parts the three
sources of international law, treaty, custom or principles are identified, along with soft law,
which is incipient, but non-binding. Laws of peace per se include all the United Nations Charter
provisions (treaty and customary) related to peace and peaceful conditions, jus ad bellum
(custom) and the law against aggression (treaty), the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations
Among States (custom and principle) and the Human Right to Peace (custom, soft law). Indirect
effects of international laws and conditions on peace include the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties (treaty), all international treaty regimes (treaty), expanding authority of international

actors and institutions in creating and interpreting international law (custom), humanitarian and
human rights law (treaty), and the Responsibility to Protect norm (soft law). The review takes a
legal approach. Development of peace law is placed in the history of international law and
within the progressive development of international law today. All peace law per se in Part 1 is
found to be legalized and binding except the Human Right to Peace which is legalized but nonbinding so far. The review identifies how peace is the ultimate purpose of all international law.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Peace is “one of the main purposes of the International Law”.1
The elephant in the room in discussions about International Law (IL) is the fact that the
fundamental purpose of all IL is to promote peace2 and world order yet that point is generally not
clearly made if addressed at all. An obligation exists under IL that requires states to conduct
themselves peacefully in all relations with other states, and there is a similar obligation to
conduct relations toward their own people in a peaceful way, that is, to honor a human right to
peace. Current research focuses on what peace may be conceptualized as (positive, negative,
meaning of, peacebuilding) or what constitutes aggression, but does not directly address what the
IL of peace is or who is bound by it, or the fact that all IL contributes to peace.
The obligation of states to conduct relations with each other in what amounted to a “just”
and peaceful way was customary law preceding the United Nations (UN) Charter. After World
War I and the deaths of nearly 19 million people3, the obligation of states under IL developed
into renouncing war as a tool of international relations in the Kellogg-Briand Pact (Peace Pact).
After World War II and the deaths of an additional estimated 56.4 million people (military and
civilian)4 international law graduated a step further to require peaceful relations in positive IL in
the UN Charter and numerous other international agreements.
Those with memories of the human tragedy of WW II are fading now and the younger
generations do not conceive how easily war can begin nor comprehend its horrors. The euphoria
upon the end of the Cold War was short-sighted. Even with news of Syria and Yemen appearing

1

Edmundo Vargas Carreno (2009). “Address”. Peace Through International Law: The Role of the International Law
Commission.
2
Malcom Shaw, International Law (4th ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 2005, 717).
3
Haythornthwaite, Philip J., The World War One Source Book pp 382-383.
4
Guinness World Records. http://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/world-records/highest-death-toll-from-wars/
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daily, the horror of what is happening there does not seem real to those who are not within the
proximity of it. Current detachment from the horror of war among western democracies and
rising nationalism worldwide is more reason to pursue lawful means to pressure all
governments…at the very least to make them consider fully their obligations to the international
community and their own citizens before they initiate armed conflict that too easily can spiral out
of control once begun.
Peaceful relations among states and people is the intended result or at least a secondary
effect of several areas of IL including the norm of a Responsibility to Protect, the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, international human rights law, humanitarian law, the
emergence of new actors creating IL, the prolific emergence of treaty regimes and functional IL,
and the increasing focus of international court decisions affecting all aspects of IL. IL exists that
arguably applies the obligation of peace to intra-state relations as well as to interstate relations.
The legalization of peaceful international and intra-national relations has progressed and
continues to progress with every new example of man’s capacity for massive destructiveness and
inhumanity. What is remarkable is that the legal principle and requirement of peaceful relations
between states and peoples is not clearly given center stage in scholarship where leaders,
scholars, and common people alike would necessarily have to focus on its guiding principle.

Previous study of IL addresses its history, development of its philosophical bases, the
various forms that law takes under IL: human rights IL, functional IL, humanitarian IL,
environmental IL, issues of enforcement, the progressive development of IL, the usefulness or
lack thereof of IL, and most particularly the laws of war and prohibitions on the use of force. In
recent years the body of IL has expanded exponentially as international institutions and
organizations have emerged. As more actors join the world stage so too have additional actors

3

joined the ranks of objects of as well as formulators of IL. We all talk about the trees of IL but
we do not discuss the forest. The forest is the fact that all of it…all IL, exists to create conditions
under which we can manage and recuperate from conflict without violence, that is, world
conditions without armed conflict, or, in other words, at least minimal conditions of peace.
Advocating a world without conflict is unrealistic, but over time, the institution of law can move
the management of conflict forward. The forest tells us that armed conflict and violence are not
legal in the relations of states and between states and their peoples5. Naming that concept the
international law of peace is merely reframing what it already is. The challenge to define exactly
what “peace” means in a social science and political sense doesn’t negate its legal existence as a
requirement under IL. There are innumerable ways to commit a murder and yet we still call each
one murder. Failure to prosecute or punish a perpetrator for murder doesn’t negate the fact that a
murder occurred.
“Peace” for the purpose of international law may be defined as the absence of aggression,
armed conflict, or the use or threat of use of force in violation of the United Nations Charter; and
as the presence of (or commitment to) conditions under which fundamental human rights: the
dignity and worth of the human person, the equal rights of men and women and of nations large
and small, and justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of
international law, can be maintained (See UN Charter, Preamble, Purpose, and Article 1; “Peace”
at UN.org/rule of law; “Peace and Security” at UN.org; International Law Commission, From
War to Peace, UN Library; International Law Commission, “Draft Declaration on Right and
Duties of States” Art. 3, 7, 8 and 9, in From War to Peace, UN Library). We use the legal

5

“individuals are not subjects of IL but may be objects of IL. Il may be for the benefit of states or individuals or
entities less than states” (Kaplan and Katzenbach, (1961). The Political Foundations of International Law. New York:
Wiley and Sons, Inc.

4

requirement of peace to prevent armed conflict, to end existing conflict, and to promote
conditions under which fundamental human rights may be maintained.
The legalization process of international peace law is ongoing. It’s lack of precision
about “peace” and lack of full delegation for enforcement do not take away from the underlying
obligation of states to conduct international relations in a peaceful manner. This essay does not
attempt to address the various political distinctions between “peace,” “peaceful conduct,” “peace
keeping” and “peace building”. Those distinctions may be the subject of other studies and will
develop as the law develops.
The heart of this essay uses a legal approach which is then evaluated in the conclusion.
The first question addressed in the essay is not why or how law guides, or how the law is
implemented, but what law does guide (Kapp 2013; see Handler 2011; core values of the law see
Begum 2014; for review of existing laws and conventions that might apply to the development of
new law see Partain 2015). Next, we address what laws, rules or international institutions and
actors are developing that affect peace and peace law. Under IL, customary law6 often precedes
treaties and conventions, and afterward may be considered law if not in conflict with the treaty.
In the case of jus cogens, a treaty may not change the obligations of the law7. We will review
what the direct law of peace is and how it applies.

6

Somewhat like the understanding of common law in a domestic system, but in IL customary law requires both
state practice and opinion juris for proof of the law. “Opinio juris denotes a subjective obligation, a sense on behalf
of a state that it is bound to the law in question” See ICJ Statute, Article 38 (1)(b). See also Theodore Meron,
(1989). Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law. New York: Oxford University Press.
7
“norms, which are defined as norms which cannot be changed through positive law methods and must,
therefore, be explained by a theory outside the positive law”, O’Connell, Mary Ellen (2008) p. 132. The Power and
Purpose of International Law: Insights from the Theory & Practice of Enforcement. New York : Oxford University
Press.

5

1.1

Purpose of the Study
The goal of this review is to identify peace as the ultimate purpose of all international

law, to explain the direct international law of peace per se, to identify laws and international
developments that have indirect effects on peace and peace law, and to explain the role of the
legalization in international law. In doing so we will review the historic basis and context of the
International Law system, development of international law respecting peace, legal development
where peace is an effect of law, and modern changes in the International Law system affecting
peace and peace law.

1

PART ONE: PEACE AS THE EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT LEGAL PURPOSE
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

1.2
2

Historical Basis and Development of the International Law of Peace.
The roots of IL and the desire of states and peoples for peace are equally deep.
Augustine said, “Peace is not sought in order to arouse war, but war is waged in order to win
peace” (Panizza, 2013-2014) and a “just war” to restore peace (Augustine, IEP). Kaplan and
Katzenbach’s perspective is that the whole purpose of IL is to develop rules to govern state
relations to avoid constant war (1961 p. 60). Pufendorf’s ultimate concept of a state of
nature was a state of peace (1672). Peace was not necessarily the opposite of war, but the
absence of war enabled conditions of peace and human existence.

3

IL traditionally concerned itself with just conduct between states to avoid unjust war and
depended on state practice for agreement on what just conduct included. Then the just
conduct concept was superseded by discussion of just war. Similarly, in the modern era, it
has been asked why we still focus on the IL of war when we should focus on the IL of

Commented [WU5]: If you want to change the name of a
section, highlight it with your cursor then type the section name you
would like in its place. Once you have done this, then you can
update the field of your table of contents.
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peace. There is a positive law of peace and an older natural law argument for peace. The
natural law argument finds a role in human rights law in the progressive legalization process
of peace law. The international law of peace derives its foundation from natural law, and in
more modern times, from customary law followed by treaty law. Where a treaty has not yet
been created on a matter of international concern, natural law and soft law are often the
initial sources in the development of IL. Customary law develops from them and also plays
a role in legal development of IL.
4

Hugo Grotius, often called the “father” of IL, articulated principles of IL in his era in De
jure belli ac pacis and jus belli (1625). By defining what “just” war consisted of, he
essentially set out when the “peace” could legally be broken in the community of nations. In
the “Old World Order,” the time before the Kellogg-Briand Pact (Hathaway and Shapiro,
2017), states followed Grotius and “considered war to be “’just’ if it consists in the
execution of a right, and ‘unjust’ if it consists in the execution of an injury” (Hathaway and
Shapiro, citing De Jure Praedae Commentarius). Peaceful options were to be considered
first, but when no peaceful option remained, a “just” war was allowed. If an enemy “had not
violated or threatened to violate any rights” states could “not wage war” (Hathaway and
Shapiro, p.10). Grotius equated reasons for waging war with those for pursuing a lawsuit…
“causes of action” to right a wrong and considered courts to be a substitute for war
(Hathaway and Shapiro, 2017 p. 9-10). In the absence of international institutions capable
of resolving disputes between states, IL developed to allow a ‘just’ resolution by war, but
war only in the context of its being ‘just’.

5

Samuel von Pufendorf contended that the law of nations is really the “law of

nature or part of civil laws of the states where observed” and as such, doesn’t “depend on universal

7

reason or mankind so long as many people and states agree on the points” (Pufendorf, 1672). The
law of nations according to many authors consisted of “customs mutually observed by tacit
consent” (Pufendorf,1672). Ius Gentium or Jus Gentium is the law of nations that is not statutory
but customary law. Cicero described it thus: ius gentium is “a higher law of moral obligation
binding human beings beyond the requirements of civil law” (Partitiones Oratoriae 37, 130) For
the customs to be universal, the obligations understood had to be general (Puffendorf,1672).
Included at that time in the voluntary law of nations were such laws as the law of embassies and
the right of burial. Hans Kelsen agrees that “customary international law represents unconscious
and unintentional lawmaking” (2003). Presently, international custom is “evidence of a general
practice accepted as law” (Art. 38(1)(b) Statute of the ICJ; Meron, 1989 citing the Nicaragua Cases
in the ICJ; Goldsmith and Posner 2005, p. 23; Dunoff, Ratner and Wippman, 2010). Mary Ellen
O’Connell8 echos Pufendorf in contending that some customary IL is from natural law, against the
critique that natural law is “hopelessly” subjective. She asserts that it is for the courts to interpret
natural law, and, what natural law is now part of IL amounts to jus cogens (O’Connell, 2013-2014
Lecture).
6

Today, evidence of both state practice and opinio juris are required to prove

customary IL. (See ICJ Statute, Article 38(1)(b). The acts concerned must “amount to a settled
practice...carried out in such a way as to be evidence of requiring it…a subjective element – belief”
(Meron, 1989, citing The North Sea Cases9 ) “Whether the practice of a state is due to a belief that

8

Hersh Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures, University of Cambridge. “Understanding the Higher Norm against
Aggression” (2013-2014). https://sms.cam.ac.uk/media/1664077
9
“it was indispensable that State practice during that period, including that of States whose interests were specially affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked and
should have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law was involved. Some 15
cases had been cited in which the States concerned had agreed to draw or had drawn the boundaries concerned
according to the principle of equidistance, but there wars no evidence that they had so acted because they had felt

8

it is legally obliged to do a particular act is often difficult to prove objectively. Therefore, opinio
juris is an unsettled and debated notion in international law” (Cornell Law School Legal
Information Institute 2018; See also Chesterman 2014). Proof may be difficult, depending on the
circumstances, but it is not impossible.
7

Customary IL may be referred to as norms of IL which are binding, or as non-binding

soft law by some scholars, adding to confusion of terms and meaning (see Shinoda, 2001; see also
Shaffer and Pollack, in Dunoff and Pollack, 2013). The binding effect of legal norms determines
whether they are part of the legal system or part of the political system, i.e. codified existing law
or part of the “progressive development of law”…de legi lata compared to de legi ferenda (Scott,
2010, p. 92; Malanczuk, 1997, p. 54; the distinction between hard and soft law according to legal
positivists depends on the “binding or nonbinding nature” of the law, Reinicke and Witte 2000;
Guzman and Meyer 2010; in Shaffer and Pollack, Dunoff and Pollack 2013). These distinctions
are important in illustration of the legal development of IL to where it is today and to what it may
become in the future.
8

Once found to exist, customary IL is law of the same legal authority as positive or

treaty IL, and when included in conventions, becomes positive IL too. An IL requiring peaceful
settlement of disputes exists as both as customary law, amounting to a jus cogens norm, and is also
binding IL under the UN Charter treaty provisions. In addition to law directly requiring peaceful
international relations, there is also IL where the maintenance of peace is an effect of the law.
9

To give historical context to the discussion of peace law, I place the evaluation of it

on the backdrop of Kaplan and Katzenbach’s (K and K’s) 3 phases of development of IL. Their
first phase consisted of the years from the Renaissance to the Congress of Vienna. K and K

legally compelled to draw them in that way by reason of a rule of customary law.” Judgment, The North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases, 20 February 1969. http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/51/5537.pdf

9

propose that during Phase 1 of IL, the whole purpose of the law was to “develop rules to govern
state relations to avoid constant war” (1961, p. 60). IL was all about guiding rulers so that they
could determine what they “ought” to do. What rulers “ought” to do was related to morality,
justice and reason, and was based upon universal principles and a universal law of nature (1961,
p. 57). During the 18th century, according to K and K, and consistent with Enlightenment
thinking, “man sought justice” (p. 67). Justice, although not equated with peace as such, seeks
the moral, just and reasonable course of action for a state. By the 19th century, during K and K’s
Phase 2, IL was viewed more as “a matter of formal political consensus and not universal moral
principles” (p. 69). During this time IL became more legalized in treaties. Positivism took
precedence. (Kaplan and Katzenbach 1962, p. 69). The positivism trend obscured the underlying
purposes of IL to seek peace and a higher moral purpose, as explained by Augustine and
Puffendorf, but did not change that purpose.
K and K’s Phase 3 of IL (WWI – 1961), continued a focus on positivism and functionalism
but also renewed interest in what states “ought” to do in the sense that it focused on documents
and institutions to avoid war (1961). That trend continues through the present.
Today, IL’s “generally agreed upon rules and principles of action” or customary laws, “serve the
indispensable function of providing a basis for the orderly management of international
relations” (Collins, 1970). Treaties are the preferred form of IL10, but custom “continues to play
a vital role,” and “non-traditional” law-making supplements both treaties and custom (Dunoff, et
al, 2010). We think of IL as a system of practice and authorities regulating the international
society “offering an alternative to anarchic society” (Chesterman, 2001 p. 9). Collins’ “orderly
management of international relations” and Chesterman’s “alternative to anarchic society” are

10

During Kaplan and Katzenbach’s Phase 2 of the development of IL, 1815-WWI, sources of IL became treaty and
custom with an increased emphasis on treaty and positive law (1961); see also Collins, Ed. 1970; and Scott 2010).
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reminiscent of K and K’s Phase 1 description of Il as a means for states to seek moral, just and
reasonable conduct in international relations, or more simply, peaceful conduct between states.
The IL determining any conduct in international relations falls in this category and becomes part
of the IL purpose to maintain peace.
The modern expanded view of IL in hierarchical order (and thus the order in which to
evaluate the law) is: treaties, customary IL, general principles of law recognized by all nations,
judicial decisions, and teachings of the most highly qualified jurists (Art. 38(1) Statute of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ); Weeramantry and Burroughs, 2005). Treaty law is binding
IL on all parties to the treaty. UN membership for all practical purposes includes all countries in
the world11 and so the UN Charter is binding on all countries and IL from the UN Charter is
universal law.
10

The current conception of the goal of IL is that IL exists for “peace, or peace and

justice” (Buchanon, 2004, p. 77). Bailliet and Larsen refer to peace as a “vague vision” that can
be moved to an “operative directive principle, referring to the “progressive evolution” of its
foundation (2015). This author contends that the “vague vision” is no less than the legal purpose
of the body of IL both explicitly and implicitly. Discussions like those of Bailliet and Larsen
attempt to arrive at social science agreement on “peace” so that conditions of “peace” may be
pursued, but for legal purposes, “peace” is defined herein in the context of the purpose of the UN
Charter, as stated in the Introduction. The following review of IL will support that position.
When reviewing legal matters, the express wording of laws, treaties and legal obligations is
the preferred place to begin (see Scott 2010; see also Putman and Albright 2014). The actual
wording of the laws is primarily determinative of the interpretation given them due to the legal

11

Palestine and The Holy See have permanent Observer Mission Status. UN.org

11

maxim that one must give words their plain meaning if not ambiguous. However, ultimately one
may go beyond the instrument to make the final determination that these plain meanings were
intended12. This article unapologetically begins its discussion of the law of peace with
significant portions of the key documents rather than simply referring to them. I will begin in
Part One with the express law of Treaties and Conventions, or the positive law of peace.
10.1 Explicit IL of Peace: The Preamble, Article 1, UN Charter
Under positive treaty law, all signatories are bound to stated legal obligations whether the
state is “feeling” the legality of the obligation or not. “The basis of obligation is the same in
every legal order: the consciousness, which prevails among the subjects of the legal order, of this
order's need to realize a common end…The purpose and the legal order cannot be separated”
(Hoffman, 1961). The United Nations Charter falls under this category of law and legal order.
The United Nations Charter Preamble in 1945 provides its purpose, which is reflected in the
Charter body. The purpose is to seek, facilitate, and maintain world peace:
•
•

•

•

to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our
lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth
of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations
large and small, and
to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations
arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained,
and
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

AND FOR THESE ENDS:
•

12

to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good
neighbours, and

McBaine, James, P. (1943).” The Rule Against Disturbing Plain Meaning of Writings”. 31(2) Cal.L.R., 143, Art. 2.
http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californiareview/vol31/iss2/2. “The ordinary or dictionary meaning of words
will be accepted unless the court is convinced that another standard was employed in the preparation of the
written instrument” (149).

12
•
•
•

to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that
armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and
social advancement of all peoples, (UN Charter).

Article 1
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,
and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace,
and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles
of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate
measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these
common ends.
(http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/preamble.shtml).
The stated purpose of the United Nations in the Charter Preamble and Article I
(1) provides clarity of intent behind the subsequent requirements in the Charter, but
perhaps more importantly, standing alone both are evidence of consensus on the
obligations accepted by states under the Charter. It is not possible to legitimately deny a
state obligation under the Charter Preamble and Art. 1 (1) to: reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, to live together
in peace, to maintain international peace and security, and not to use armed force, based
on these words along with state practice. No Court has been called upon to rule on the
legal status of those words, but it is difficult to imagine any international court
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concluding anything other than that the Preamble and Art. 1 (1) express legal obligations
under the Charter even though mandatory language is not included at that point.

Consider the terms of the Preamble of the United States Constitution. The Preamble
clarifies the intent of the American Founders: to establish justice and secure the blessing
of liberty among other purposes, and more. Is it legitimate to legally challenge whether
establishing justice and securing liberty are requirements of the document even though
they are not fully defined in the body of the document? We are still defining what
“justice” and “liberty” mean in the United States but we don’t question the legal
obligation to provide both, through national and state government, to our citizens because
of the Constitution. The body of the UN Charter mandates what members “shall” do and
then sets out the authority of the Security Council (SC) to implement and enforce the
purpose and requirements of the Charter, somewhat analogous to American courts
interpreting the U. S. Constitution.

10.2 Article 2 (3) and Article 2(4) and other UN Charter Provisions.

The UN legal mandates that relate to international peace and security are listed
below but for the sake of brevity some are not verbatim:
•
•

Art. 2, Par. 3 provides that: “All Members shall settle their international
disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and
security, and justice, are not endangered”; and
Art. 2, Par. 4 : “All members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations (UN Charter; see Collins, p.340; Bailliet and
Larsen refer to this provision as jus cogens law based on the ICJ Nicaragua
Judgment 2015).

14

•

•
•

•
•
•

Chapter VI, Art. 33 requires parties (“shall, first of all”) to seek solutions to
disputes by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful
means of their own choice.
Art. 34 empowers the Security Council (“may”) to investigate any dispute.
Chapter VII, Art. 39 mandates that the Security Council (SC) determine
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression
and allows it to make recommendations or decide what measures shall be
taken to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Art. 41 of Chapter VII gives the SC discretion to decide what measures to use
outside of armed force in order to give effect to its decisions.
Art. 42 (Ch. VII) authorizes the SC to take measures by air, sea or land forces
as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security if
the Art. 41 measures would be or have proved to be inadequate. And, notably,
Art. 43 makes all signatory states subject to assisting the SC measures
undertaken for peace and security.
(UN Charter; and Collins 1970, p. 340-342).

The foregoing provisions legally require peaceful behaviors by member states as positive
direct law and enable action by the Security Council. The required behaviors exist to facilitate
peaceful conditions in the world. Art. 2 (3) requires that disputes be settled so as not to endanger
international peace. The Art. 2 (3) obligation was also held to be customary IL in the Nicaragua
v. United States of America Case in the International Court of Justice in 1986 (Nicaragua Case).
Art. 2(4) mandates that members may not use force or the threat of force against another state in
a way inconsistent with the Charter. Also involved in the 1986 Nicaragua Cases the “parties
agreed that the Charter provisions represented customary law and the Court accepted this without
going into the question of how far the meaning of Article 2(4) was fixed or how far it had
evolved over time” (Gray 2008; Nicaragua Cases 1986). The remaining obligations from the
Charter listed above are positive law of the Charter13 and customary law too. The legal definition
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The International Law Commission has done a report on identifying customary IL and intends to create a list of
customary IL at some time in the future. See Chapter V, A/71/10. International Law Commission.
Legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/reports/2016/English/chp5.pdf&lang=EFSRAC
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of “peace” in IL is derived from these provisions of Art. 2 (3) and 2 (4) in view of the stated
purpose of the UN.
The UN Charter unambiguously exists to maintain world peace (“to maintain
international peace and security” Art. 1(1)). The behaviors addressed are legal obligations for
the member states, ignoring for the sake of argument the issue of how enforcement should or
might occur. There is no doubt that legally all 193 states have agreed to the mandatory and
authorizing terms of the UN Charter. In doing so, they have accepted the legal obligation to
adhere to peaceful conditions as between states, or more simply, they have agreed to an IL of
peace.
10.3 Prohibition of the Use of Force (Kellogg-Briand)
11

The UN Charter represents the ongoing development of Il. Previously, the Hague

Peace Conventions of 1899 and 1907 introduced the concept of an international court of
arbitration to settle disputes and promoted laws of war and war crimes. World War I’s
devastation gave reason for The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 (KB) (Treaty for the Renunciation
of War, often called The Peace Pact) which contained language that set the course for subsequent
treaties regarding war and peace, stating signatories “condemn recourse to war for the solution of
international controversies, and renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations
with one another.…” (1928). (The League of Nations Covenant, although part of the progression
of law toward result of legalizing peace, did not reach the level of prohibition of armed violence
that KB states14). In Art. II of KB, the following unequivocal language states “the settlement or
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See the Covenant of the League of Nations in 1924 which did not renounce aggression or the use of force or war.
Its language recites an “obligation not to resort to war”, a purpose to “achieve international peace and security”
and a recognition that peace “requires reduction of national armaments”. It did assert that: “The Members of the
League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political
independence of all Members of the League”. http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/leagueofnations.htm
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solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which
may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.” (Kellogg-Briand Pact
1928; Collins Ed. 1970 p. 340). Unfortunately, there were no enforcement mechanisms built into
the treaty (see KB). So, KB was notably followed by the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, World
War II and many other armed conflicts. However, like the principle “All men are created equal”
in the Declaration of Independence, the articulation of the standard: the concept that war is no
longer a legitimate tool in international relations (peace was then defined as the absence of war),
took on an inherent value in directing legalization of the IL of peace over time. The renunciation
of war survived as a guiding principle in IL of the law of peace. Hathaway and Shapiro point to
KB as the watershed moment between their “Old” and “New” World Orders, the Old being the
time when war (use of force) was accepted as a tool in international relations, and the New
referring to the time after KB when war was outlawed as a tool of international relations. (see
Hathaway and Shapiro, 2017).
12

Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter legally requires all members to “refrain from the

threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”. Article 2(4) is the
operative law of KB (O’Connell, 2013-2014). However, self-defense is allowed under the UN
Charter, so interpretation of what amounts to legal self-defense and the permissible use of force
remains an issue. In the Nicaragua Case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) determined that
self-defense is to be interpreted “in the light of customary international law.”15 Current
scholarship and international court interpretation leave the interpretation of a legal “use of force”
as a “dynamic interpretation of Articles 51 and 2(4) based on the development of state practice
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Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (hereinafter Nicaragua Case) ICJ
Reports (1986) 14 at para 176.
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(Gray 2008; Gray citing herself in Lowe and Warbrick, 1994). Several UN General Assembly
resolutions have elaborated on the use of force over the years and western states apparently
“accept the legal significance and customary international law status” of some of them (Gray, 9).
However, ambiguity still exists respecting controversial issues (2008). Christine Gray opines that
the 1987 Declaration on the Non-Use of Force, meant to clarify some of the remaining issues,
really does no more than the Declaration on Friendly Relations (2008). The UN Security
Council has authority to determine whether any state conduct endangers peace and security in
violation of the Charter. Although there is no agreement as to whether SC decisions are
“conclusive as to legality, illegality, and as to the content of the applicable norms” (Gray 2008 at
13), SC decisions do legalize action taken pursuant to them. Absent SC intervention, court
interpretation remains the means of identifying what state conduct is legal.
13

In the Congo Case, Uganda claimed it acted in self-defense as justification for its use of
force. The ICJ rejected the defense saying:
14

Uganda never claimed that it had been the victim of an armed attack by the
armed forces of the DRC; the “armed attacks” to which reference was made
came rather from the ADF; there was no satisfactory proof of the
involvement in these attacks, direct or indirect, of the Government of the
DRC; and the attacks did not emanate from armed bands or irregulars sent by
the DRC, or on behalf of the DRC, within the meaning of Article 3 (g) of
General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 1974 on the Deﬁnition of
Aggression.
(Judgment, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda 19 December 2005).

Presumably self-defense may be authorized by the SC if a state seeks SC approval prior to the
use of force, the key being prior approval. That may or may not be possible in all circumstances
and the decision whether self-defense was justified under the law may have to be viewed
retrospectively. At any rate, the use of force is not legal in IL except in the event of legitimate
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self-defense and only the SC and the ICJ can legitimize it. Maintaining world peace and security
require that force not be available as a remedy for disputes.

15

For years during the Cold War the Security Council (SC) was unable to act to enforce

UN positive law due to potential and actual vetoes by the United States and the U.S.S.R, yet
world war was avoided. During these years, progress was still being made in legal development
of the obligation of states to maintain peace. The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations
Among States (GA/RES/2625) (“The Declaration”) defined aggression as a crime against peace
for which there is legal responsibility under IL, specifically stating:
Emphasizing the paramount importance of the Charter of the
United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and
security and for the development of Friendly relations and Cooperation among States…Reaffirming …the maintenance of
international peace and security and the development of
friendly relations and co-operation between nations are among
the fundamental purposes of the United Nations…the
paramount importance of the Charter of the UN in the
promotion of the rule of law among nations…equally essential
that all States shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the UN…that all States shall settle their
international disputes by peaceful means in accordance with the
Charter…A war of aggression constitutes a crime against the
peace, for which there is responsibility under international
law…the use of force to deprive peoples of their national identity
constitutes a violation of their inalienable rights and of the
principle of non-intervention…etc.”
(http://www.hku.edu/law/conlawhk/conlaw/outline/Outline4/2625.
htm 10/13/2010).

Other parts of The Declaration are equally important to the legalization of peace. The
Declaration prefaces the body of its content by reaffirming previous UN resolutions “in
which it affirmed the importance of the progressive development and codification of the
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principles of International Law concerning friendly relations and cooperation between
States” (GA/RES/2625). In doing so it attaches itself to the legal status of the UN Charter
provisions as well as its independent legal status. The Declaration provides that states have
an obligation “not to intervene in the affairs of any other State” since any form of
intervention violates the “letter of the Charter” and “leads to the creation of situations which
threaten international peace and security (GA/RES/2625).
And:
any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and
territorial integrity of a State or country or of its political independence is
incompatible with the purposes and principle of the Charter (GA/RES/2625).
States have a “duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”
(GA/RES/2625). And also, that:
Every state has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigation, assisting or
participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or
acquiescing in organized activities within its territory directed toward the
commission of such acts when the acts referred to in the present paragraph
involve a threat or a use of force.

All States shall comply in good faith with their obligations under the generally
recognized principles and rules of International Law with respect to the
maintenance of international peace and security.” “States shall cooperate in the
promotion of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms
for all…
(GA/RES/2625).
Most importantly, principles set forth in the Declaration are declared to “constitute
principles of International Law” (GA/RES/2625). General principles of international law
have always been considered part of the body of IL, cannot be “overridden by treaty” and
are “best explained by natural law” (O’Connell 2013-2014). Whether the principles are
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fully enforceable is not the issue in this review. The provisions of The Declaration are part
of positive IL and the law of peace.
Another important aspect of The Declaration is the potential for it to be used as a legal tool
to deal with states that become involved in civil wars in other states. States are not to even
assist in acts of civil strife in other states. The roadblock of enforcement may prevent
meaningful use of The Declaration provisions for the instances that occur now in civil strife,
but Hathaway and Shapiro’s “outcasting” demonstrates potential for putting pressure on
states that that violate the Declaration (2017 Ch. 15).

At any rate, The Declaration

reinforced the IL of peace during an historical period of difficult progress in IL.
Since the Cold War ended in 1991, the UN’s effectiveness has experienced mostly
positive changes. At first the SC was unable to act quickly enough to be effective in
situations like Serbia/Kosovo and Rwanda. However, the SC learned from its failures. The
SC response to Libya in 2011 (SC Resolution 1970, 1973) is seen as an improvement in
enforcing the UN Charter respecting peace. As effectiveness of the UN role in international
relations increases, so does effectiveness of IL of peace.
15.1 Jus ad bellum and Aggression.
A recap of the terms used to refer to IL relating to war and by inverse relationship to
peace law, is helpful here. The old categories of the law of war and in war date back to St.
Augustine but are most well-known in connection with Hugo Grotius’s work On the Law of War
and Peace (Stahn 2008 at 313; Guinn at 765). The terms jus ad bellum and jus in bello were
traditionally used to classify legal scholarship regarding the law leading to war (“on recourse to
force”) and the law that applies in war and “governing the conduct of hostilities” (Stahn 2008;
Murphy 2013; Maus 2014). Jus ad Bellum refers to the law on the justification of and limits to
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the use of armed force, the law leading to war (Maus 2014; Allison 2018). Jus Belli or Jus in
Bello is the customary law in war or “laws applicable to armed conflict” (Maus 2014; Allison
2018; Chesterman 2001, citing Grotius 1625). Jus Pacis is the law during times of peace
(Grotius 1625; Stahn 2008).
The law leading to war involves when aggression or the use of force is justified in
international law. The law of aggression and the use of force were integral to the development of
the law of peace per se. UN Charter Art. 2 (4) is now the controlling IL on the use of force. The
legal definition of “peace” is the absence of aggression, or armed conflict, or the use or threat of
use of force in violation of the United Nations Charter; and as a presence of (or commitment to)
conditions under which fundamental human rights: the dignity and worth of the human person,
the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and justice and respect for the
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained (see
UN Charter) . The positive IL on the use of force and aggression partially delineates the IL of
peace. States are the subjects of IL, but individuals are also objects of IL and state aggression
and use of force impact individuals directly. The laws of aggression and use of force are
therefore inherently connected to human rights and humanitarian issues. The law of aggression
and the use of force has to do with peace per se whereas peace is an effect of humanitarian law,
human rights law and other law of the International Criminal Court
Use of the term “aggression” in the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations Among
States was criticized for failing to include a clear legal standard. States needed to know what
state behavior specifically was considered out-of-bounds, so to speak, in customary IL and the
prohibitions of the UN Charter. States also considered the Declaration on Friendly Relations
statement to be for the benefit of the Security Council and did not insist on a better definition
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most likely because of the use they considered it for (Solera 2010). Another problem with the
definition became apparent when it was anticipated that the developing international crime of
aggression would fall within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) after 2002
and “penal rules must clearly describe the conduct that is considered unlawful” (Solera 2010).
UN Resolution 3314 on 14 December 1974 (soft law) initially defined an act of state
“aggression” as follows:
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations…
The Resolution includes the following as specific acts of aggression:

(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of
another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such
invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another
State or part thereof,
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of
another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of another
State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another
State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or
marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of
another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the
conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in
such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act of
aggression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups,
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another
State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial
involvement therein.
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(A/RES/29/3314 with Annex).
The international individual “crime of aggression” was not defined until the Kampala
Conference in 2010 and amendment to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court as
Article 8 bis, activated and now approved by 35 states (positive treaty law):
… the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a
position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military
action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale,
constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations. 2.
… “act of aggression” means the use of armed force by a State against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in
accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14
December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression…[repeating a-g of the 1974
Resolution above here].
(Rome Statute, Art. 8 bis http://untreaty.unoorg/ilc/summaries/7_5.htm ;
see also Akanda 2010).

The prohibition against aggression is also a jus cogens norm based on natural law theory
coupled with the positive law of the ICC (See O’Connell, 2013-2014, the Nicaragua Cases (1986)
from the International Court of Justice (ICJ); and the International Law Commission (ILC), 20132014, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures). Jus Cogens norms of IL are not necessarily in the
treaty category unless reiterated in one. (Aggression is part of treaty law: Rome Statute). Typically,
jus cogens “emerge from social life” so are considered part of natural law and are subject to reason
(O’Connell). They don’t need “explanation, custom or treaty” (O’Connell 2013-2014)16.

16
Those norms of general international law accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as those from which no modification, derogation
or abrogation is permitted.

Norms of Jus Cogens protect the fundamental values of the international
community, are hierarchically superior to other norms of international law and are
universally applicable.
(International Law Commission, Special Rapporteur, Draft 3, 27 May 2015).
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Peace at its minimum is a condition of being without war or aggression or use or threat of
force (see Morgenthau 1948). The use of war as a tool of international relations has been
outlawed since KB in 1928. Aggression by “use of armed force by a State against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations” has been positive IL since the
Charter and a jus cogens norm of IL since at least 1974. “Aggression” has been an individual
crime in IL since 2010. The law prohibiting aggression as a component of positive peace law per
se is fully legalized through obligation, precision and delegation.
15.2 The New Human Right to Peace.
International human rights law is also part of the foundation for the IL of peace. A human
rights law momentum resulted in a UN General Assembly Resolution affirming the human right
to peace, and implicitly, a human right to life. The 2016 Human Right to Peace was the result of
extensive work coming out of the UN and joined other soft laws requiring peace already in
existence. Meyres McDougal provocatively makes this comment in his 1989 article on “Law
and Peace”:
Hence, for reasons of interdependence or identity, there can be but one answer to
President John F. Kennedy's question "Is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a
matter of human rights?"12 The basic community policies that underlie conceptions
of peace and human rights are in any democratic community the same policies that
underlie all law (1989).
The “Declaration on the Right to Peace” was adopted by the General Assembly on
December 19, 2016. It states that “everyone has the right to enjoy peace such that all human
rights are promoted and protected and development is fully realized” (A/RES/71/189). Art. 2 and
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3 require that states “should” take certain steps that would assist in building peace. “Should”
expresses what is accepted as “right” conduct by states. In Art. 4 states “shall” promote
education for peace, so that provision is legally binding. Art. 5 reiterates that nothing in the
declaration “shall” be interpreted as “contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN”
(A/RES/71/189). Unfortunately, that means that states still may use Charter protected selfdefense as an excuse for the use of force.
All resolutions of the General Assembly are not necessarily considered hard IL (Oberg
2006). Yet as nonbinding soft law, the human right to peace is progressing in the legalization
process of becoming hard law (See Ku, 2012; Diehl and Ku 2010). Ian Hurd says that the power
of IL is not from compliance but from its “ability to shape the terrain for political contestation in
international relations” (2014, p. 367). A nonbinding resolution has that power despite its
nonbinding nature (Oberg 2006).
The new human right to peace represents an IL milestone. The wording of the right does not
mandate specific behavior by member states other than promoting education for peace.
However, considered in the context of all other requirements of IL and the UN Charter, one may
argue that the new Right to Peace is soft IL. Given that position, one may also argue that it is
binding on all whether by consent or not. Raising the specter of enforcement difficulties does
not negate the existence of the right any more than enforcement issues would negate the
existence of any IL (Abbott, et al. 2000). The legal effect of this new human right to peace will
be determined as states, IOs and international courts react to it. If the SC uses it to make
decisions to protect international peace, then it will move toward binding IL. As state and nonstate actors act as though they accept it as binding, it will become so over time. How much time
will that process take? There is no way to predict a timeline.
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One very important aspect of the Human Right to Peace is its potential for use as a legal tool
to control some of the civil wars that are prevalent now. Hathaway and Shapiro find empirically
that “violations of basic economic and social rights and physical integrity rights increase the risk
of civil war, while the effect of other civil and political rights is minor” (2017 Ch. 7). The
implication is that increasing the strength of human rights IL can “reduce conflict risk” (Ch. 7).
There are two ways to approach strengthening HR law. One is discussed in the Conclusion
herein involving domestication of international treaties and conventions so that domestic courts
will constrain actors within state. There are some limitations on the effectiveness of that method,
mainly being that in states with dictators the courts won’t have much chance to be effective. The
second method is to use international action through the SC by virtue of Art. 1(3) (encourage
respect for human rights), Art. 2(3)(legal obligation to settle international disputes by peaceful
means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered,
Art. 39 (SC to determine the existence of any threat to the peace and to maintain or restore
international peace and security) and Art.42 (Ch. VII) (authority of the SC to take measure
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security). Most intra-state conflict spills
over into surrounding states threatening international peace and security. The migration and
refugee issues of 2014-present are examples of that problem. Human rights law has the potential
for growing into a means to control some of this conflict and to minimize the damage to people.
The soft law efforts outlining development of human rights IL generally and contributing to
the human right to peace are as influential on the growth of peace law as the Human Right to
Peace is (Abbott, et al. 2000). The following series of events illustrates the continuum on Abbott
et al.’s spectrum of development for IL from normative statement to soft law. In the conclusion
herein, existence of relative obligation, precision and delegation are presented as means to locate
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the extent of legalization of a concept. The events listed below although not exclusive, are
offered as illustration of human rights law development of obligation, precision and delegation.
These efforts are:
15.2.1 1948 UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (UDHR):
Art. 3: “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person”.
Art. 5: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment”.
Art. 8: “Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted
him by the constitution of by law”.
Art. 12: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his
honour and reputation.”
Art. 18: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; …
Art. 28: “Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully
realized”
(Cranston 1973 p. 88).
This document forms the foundation for the progress of human rights law for the last 70
years. The new human right to peace culminated from work during those years toward
conditions of peace for people.
15.2.2 1949/51 UN Genocide Convention: “Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind
from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required,”
http://www.preventgenocide.org/law/convention/text.htm 48/2011)
15.2.3 1953-2010 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), formerly European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms with
Protocols:
Reaffirming their profound belief in those Fundamental Freedoms
which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best
maintained on the one hand by an effective political democracy and on the other
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by a common understanding and observance of the Human Rights upon which
they depend… (Cranston 1973 p. 137).
15.2.4 1966/1976 INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS:
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the
Charter of the UN, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world…the ideal of free human beings
enjoying freedom from fear and want …obligation States under the Charter of
the UN to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
freedoms…
(Cranston, with similar language in the Preamble of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, p. 93 and 107).
15.2.5 1982/1986 Article 23 of the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, which
affirms the right of all peoples to national and international peace, and the duty to
strengthen solidarity and friendly relations among peoples.
15.2.6 2006-2010 LUARCA/SANTIAGO DECLARATION ON THE HUMAN RIGHT TO PEACE:
…peace is a universal value…positive concept of peace…taking into
account principles and rules enshrined in the main human rights instruments
of the UN…Individuals,groups and peoples have the inalienable right to a
just, sustainable and lasting peace… Everyone has the right to human
security…the right to civil disobedience and conscientious objection for peace…
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15.2.7 25-29 JANUARY 2010 HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL: adopted for the first time in 2008 a
resolution entitled “Promotion of the right of peoples to peace” reiterating the
traditional position that “peoples of our planet have a sacred right to peace” and that
“preservation and protection of this right constitutes a fundamental obligation of each
State”. A workshop was held in Geneva in December 2009 to further clarify the content
and scope of this right. (UNGA A/HRC/AC?4/NGO/3 20 January 2010). The eventual
result of this work was the 2016 General Assembly Resolution adopting the Human Right
to Peace. The process of work on the Human Right to Peace illustrated the developmental
aspect of peace law generally.
15.3

Development of International Law as a Continuum
The development of the direct laws of peace per se reviewed in Part 1 illustrate a

continuum of the law. In Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro’s book The Internationalists: How
a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the World, the story of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the
development of IL prohibiting war is recounted with an argument for reinvigorating the
development of IL and peace. Their perspective is that KB created a turning point in IL and
international relations by outlawing war, regardless of whether all war has ceased since 1928,
and that due to the turning point, KB then became encapsulated in the UN Charter. Their
argument fits with the perspective of other scholars who previously said that IL is the product of
progressive development and is best explained by utilizing a legalization framework (Goldstein
et al. 2000 p.386). A legalization framework illustrates how developing law allows for
“normative evolution” (Goldstein et al. 397). The progression of human rights initiatives leading
up to the human right to peace reviewed in Part 1 illustrate the progression that Abbott et al.
(2000) describe from soft law norm to customary hard law. The progression from Grotius’s law
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of “just war” to KB’s outlawing of war, to the UN Charter prohibition of aggression and the
illegal use of force is an example in which hard IL has been made over time. Direct peace law in
the UN Charter is universally binding jus cogens. But the legalization process described below
illustrates how peace law continues to progress and how to consider aspects of the law.
Abbott et al. describe the elements of legalization of IL: obligation, precision and
delegation. The lack of full development of all three of those elements does not negate the
existence of an IL and it is actually “inappropriate” to draw absolute lines between law and
politics when a continuum on the spectrum for obligation, precision and delegation is understood
to exist in IL (Abbott, et al. 2000). Generally, the more legalized a concept, the less subject it is
to the political realm and the more it exists in the legal realm. “Obligation” is when “states or
other actors are bound by a rule or commitment or by a set of rule or commitments…that they
are legally bound…in the sense that their behavior thereunder is subject to scrutiny under the
general rules, procedures, and discourse of IL, and often of domestic law as well” (Abbott et al,
2000, 401). “Precision” is when there is no ambiguity in the rules (Abbott et al. 2000), and
“delegation” is when “third parties have been granted authority to implement, interpret, and
apply the rules, to resolve disputes, and to (possibly) make further rules” (Abbott et al. at 401).
Abbott et al. use a linear scale (somewhat like a Likert scale) to illustrate the levels on a
spectrum for each of the criteria: obligation, precision and delegation, met by any IL or
developing norm (2000).
The direct legal obligation of states to provide peace exists as presented in Part 1 herein.
The level of precision and delegation of peace law inures to the effectiveness of the law rather
than to its existence. In applying obligation criteria to the law of peace, the analysis can be
framed two ways: First, recognize the legal obligation to maintain international peace and to
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prevent conflict standing by itself, or second, recognize legal obligations of each component of
peace law - to refrain from the threat or use of force, to settle disputes by peaceful means, to
protect the human right to peace, and to protect a human right to life (UDHR).
Addressing the second option first, states have a direct positive/hard jus cogens law
obligation to refrain from the illegal threat or use of force (UN Art. 2(4) and to settle disputes by
peaceful means (UN Art. 2(3). The human right to peace is a direct soft law (non-binding) norm.
The human right to life is included in the UDHR and the UDHR is customary law. Therefore, all
the separate parts of direct peace law in Part 1 are legal obligations of IL. Where each part of the
law of peace is a legal obligation, it follows logically that the obligation to maintain international
peace is the ultimate legal obligation.
In Part 2 of this essay I will discuss jus in belli, The Vienna Convention of the Law of
Treaties, treaty regimes and functional IL, human rights law generally, R2P, the evolution of
actors creating peace law, the role of courts, and the developing jus post bellum to illustrate how
other areas of IL have indirect effects on peace and peace law. These areas of IL range from hard
law in the VCLT to soft law to conditions like the increasing roles of nonstate actors in drafting
agreements and the morphing role of the SC. The obligation spectrum represented by all these
extends from nonlegal norms to binding rules (Abbott, et al., 404). When a rule is legally
binding “states may assert legal claims” and “invoke procedures” (411). Abbott et al. add that
even “nonbinding declarations can shape the practices of states and other actors and their
expectations of appropriate conduct leading to the emergence of customary law or the adoption
of harder agreements” and “soft commitments may also implicate the legal principle of good
faith compliance” (412). The result is that all the examples given in Part 2 contribute indirectly
to peace and the IL of peace in some form or fashion when obligation is considered in the
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analysis. Each area would have to be analyzed independently to establish where it exists on the
spectrum of obligation, precision and delegation, an endeavor that is beyond the scope of this
review.
Precision in the law is the second criteria to consider in legalization (Abbott et al. 2000).
A unified concept of peace falls in the category of being “standard-like” as opposed to being
“rule-like” (413). However, if the direct peace law of Part 1 is broken down into its component
parts, precision may be more rule-like for parts such as the prohibition of aggression, the
requirement to settle disputes peacefully, and the illegal use of force. Aggression is clearly
defined in IL. The illegal use of force exists when the SC or the ICJ says the use of force was
illegal and for the SC, that would be when use of force occurs without prior authorization by the
SC. The availability of self-defense under the UN Charter can cloud precision on the use of
force in some fact situations. In others, precision would be clarified from the facts. The law itself
is not ambiguous: force is illegal except in cases of self-defense, but facts may make the
situation ambiguous. The part of peace law that requires states to maintain international peace
and security may be accused of ambiguity since those conditions are subject to interpretation.
The human right to peace is an inherently ambiguous law. However, precision may be
established by a standard rather than a rule for both examples. In domestic law, the reasonable
man standard is ubiquitous. What determines reasonableness depends on the facts of the
circumstances. The SC and the ICJ can interpret what the facts presented under the IL to
maintain peace and security, the legal use of force and the human right to peace. The SALT
agreements are one of Abbott et al.’s examples of an international agreement that is “rule-like” in
that there were specific details about ICBMs in the agreement. Lack of a precise rule does not
negate the existence of the law.
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Whether any given violation in the international community amounts to failure to
“maintain international peace and security,” or an illegal “use of force,” or a violation of the
human right to peace, depends on a finding of facts and interpretation of the circumstances, like
the reasonable man standard of domestic law. The SC or an international court may interpret the
circumstances to arrive at legal precision. The need for a fact finder does not negate the
existence of the law any more than asking a jury to determine if a man acted reasonably under
certain circumstances would negate the domestic law in question. The law must put states on
notice about types of behaviors. The requirements to maintain international peace and security,
not to use illegal force and to respect the human right to peace do place states on sufficient legal
notice.
Delegation of Authority to Implement, Interpret, Apply Rules, or Resolve Disputes is the
third criteria of legalization. In the international community there are multiple examples of
delegation to third parties: The Security Council, the ICJ, the ICC, mechanisms written into
conventions, WTO, Soviet era arms control treaties and more. As discussed in Part 2 herein, the
SC has begun to take an almost legislative role and is the gatekeeper for the legal use of force
and the imposition of peacekeeping and peacebuilding functions, so its determination of legality
of the use of force is highly delegated. The ICJ makes findings of fact when peace has been
violated and determines what law applies. The ICC makes findings of fact and imposes judgment
on individuals for crimes against humanity, bringing enforcement to the domestic level.
Delegation of peace law is incomplete but is advancing on its continuum and spectrum. Due to
the UN SC, direct peace law in Part 1 is delegated.
So, although Stephen Walt critiques KB calling it “misplace idealism” and an “irrelevant
footnote to history” (2017) he does not evaluate the impact of legalization on direct peace law
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obligations in the UN Charter. The development of IL and specifically law regarding
management of conflict and (by definition) peace, has progressed more as Hathaway and Shapiro
propose than not. The point in this essay is not the degree of implementation or enforcement of
the peace law, but the development and existence of legal obligations to maintain international
peace and security and human security.
Analogous to the Declaration of Independence recitation that the purpose of government is to
secure our rights, the UN Charter recites its purpose to maintain international peace and security,
which is the purpose of all IL. Just as the Declaration of Independence set forth the principle
that “all men are created equal” which has guided American law ever since, the Kellogg-Briand
Pact set forth the principle that war is not available as a tool of international relations, guiding IL
since then. Aristide Briand said upon the signing of KB: “Peace is proclaimed: that is well, that
is much. But it still remains necessary to organize it…That is to be the work of tomorrow”
(Hathaway and Shapiro, Conclusion, 2017). As Briand predicted, Hathaway and Shapiro have
shown, and Abbott et al. describe, legal development of IL affecting peace continues.
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2

PART 2: PEACE AS AN EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

In Part One I discussed peace as such under international law. In Part 2 I will discuss peace as
an effect of international law. There are ILs, areas of IL, and international developments
affecting IL that result in the legal development of peace. Among these are development of law
affecting state responsibility to maintain peace within borders, the Vienna Convention of the
Law of Treaties, human rights and humanitarian law, the development of international treaty
regimes generally, the so-called Responsibility to Protect, development of the International
Criminal Court and international courts generally, and emerging Jus Post Bellum.
What About Peace Within States?
International law has the power to “bind both nations and individuals” through sanctions and
their enforcement (O’Connell, 2008 p. 16). Several international conventions and agreements
have effects within state borders producing conditions favorable to peace. The” binding force of
IL derives from civitas maxima: the will of the international community” (Lauterpacht, 1933,
2011). According to Lauterpacht, IL exists for states, but states serve human beings. He goes on
to clarify that the international community is “a community of individuals whose will …was
expressed by states” (Feichtner, 2011). Hathaway and Shapiro speak of “outcasting” whereby
states and individuals are brought under the pressure of the international community to force
them to comply with international law. Examples would be any international agreements/regimes
where compliance measures are written into conventions or agreements (other than the UN
Charter since it is already enforceable as positive law) whereby the soft law of the agreement (if
the agreement is not hard law yet) is moved toward hard law by self-imposed measures. If the
agreement is already hard law, delegation of compliance/enforcement issues strengthens it in the
international community, building civitas maxima. In this way, peace is an effect of general IL

36

as society becomes more ordered thus reducing actual conflict and the potential for conflict. This
concept has potential for extending IL obligations of peace inside of state borders. States are
increasingly bound to honor obligations not to create conditions that threaten peace and security
under the UN Charter as found by the Security Council. The following is a list of UN sponsored
agreements that have effects on peace and create legal obligations for states with effects
conducive to peace inside their borders:

•

•

International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965)

•

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)

•

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)

•

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979)

•

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982)

•

Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)

•

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (1996)

•

International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999)

•

International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2005)

•

Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006)

•

United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or

Partly by Sea (2008)
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(2008)
(http://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/international-law-and-justice/index.html )

15.4 Jus in Belli
The law of war involves issues such as the banning of biological and chemical weapons,
the treatment of prisoners of war, the treatment of civilians and other humanitarian issues.
Humanitarian law derives from jus in belli. By lowering the levels of violence in conflict and
possibly eliminating some forms of conflict and aggression, jus in belli has a direct effect on the
use of force and international peace and security even though it may not cause peace itself.
Quinn points out that humanitarian law, human rights law and international criminal law all
“promote peace by protecting human dignity” (2018). Examples of humanitarian laws that seek
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to limit effects of armed conflict and thus affect peace are the Geneva Conventions beginning in
194917 and the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 (Hague Peace Conference).
15.5 The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT)
The Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT) of 1969 entering into force in 1980,
is hard law on how to interpret the law. Although the VCLT does not itself require peace or
resolve substantive disputes, it is positive law that aids in preventing disputes from spiraling into
armed conflict. Peace is an effect of VCLT. An apropos analogy is that every good lawyer
knows that one strives to win in the courtroom, but the point is not to have to be in the courtroom
in the first place. VCLT is also an example of legalization in IL…in this instance, legalizing the
process itself. In this way VCLT contributes to hard IL of peace. The pacta sunt servanda rule
in the VCLT, “the principle that agreements must be performed” (Kaplan and Katzenbach 1961,
25) is stabilizing in that states must be able to trust that other states will comply with their treaty
obligations in good faith (Nolte, Ed. 2009, p. 79).
One scholar poses the following question: “in assessing the contribution of law of treaties to
the maintenance of peace and security, should the test or the determining factor be the final
settlement of the dispute or would not the law of treaties redeem and contribute to peace and
stability by…channeling a conflict that otherwise has the potential of getting out of hand?” (p.
120). That is, staying out of the courtroom? Peace and security are facilitated by treaty regimes
that keep the parties out of open conflict. According to that perspective, all treaties regulating
conduct between states are part of the IL facilitating peace and security, even though they do not
specifically require “peace”. The effects of channeling conflict and reducing uncertainty about
actions of states contribute to maintaining conditions of peace.

17

Geneva Conventions. https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions
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Treaty Regimes and Functional IL
16

Rules developed in almost all international regimes and functional IL reduce the
potential for inter- state conflict and effectively support international peace and security by
doing so. “International institution” is often equated with “international regime” and is
broadly conceived as “sets of rules meant to govern international behavior in specific issue
areas” (Engstrom 2010, p. 2). International regimes supplement the formal IOs within an
analytical framework that focuses on the rules, norms, and principles governing state
behavior.

17

To the extent that the rules of a regime are formal, they can be referred to as positive IL,
binding on participant states. Even the informal rules play a role in institutionalizing
behavior that may become formally recognized as IL in time. In the international
lawmaking process “International rules as embedded in regimes can be effective even if
compliance is low as “high levels of compliance can indicate low, readily met and
ineffective standards” and regimes with “significant non-compliance can still be effective if
they induce changes in behavior” (Engstom p. 3).

18

Environmental security issues are a good example of increasing potential for state
conflict. Interestingly, environmental law has been a partial success story for IL. Nele
Matz-Luck, Senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and
International Law, writes that “A definition of global peace – even if reduced to the
definition as the absence of war – must necessarily take into consideration aspects of
environmental security” (Engstrom p. 127). Water issues will increasingly be the subject of
serious controversy between states and among peoples. There are many examples of treaties
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and conventions in natural resources and environmental concerns as the international
legalization process in that regime area grows.
19

Treaty regimes have proven to be effective tools in development of IL. The more
interconnected regime law is, the more pathways to mediate conflict between states exist,
reducing the possibility of conflict and use of armed force. The multitude of regimes in IL
is too lengthy to list, but all contribute to peace law by regulating interactions among states.
A comparative study of several regimes’ contribution to prevention of conflict would be
helpful to the development of IL of peace. Human rights regimes deserve special mention
due to the close relationship of human rights to peace.

19.1 Human Rights Law Generally
All Human Rights Law (HR) and Humanitarian Law (HL) “mesh with the general
principles of IL” to “advance its effectiveness” (Theron, 1989). Peace is the most basic of
human rights (Alston, 1980, peace as a human right). The goal of human rights law generally is
to “avoid destructive conflict” (Guinn 2018, 780) which is also a goal of peace law. HRL
resurrects Phase One of Kaplan and Katzenbach’s phases of the development of IL in the sense
that HR has a moral dimension… of what “ought” to be true between the state and individuals.
HR law is a “means of promoting and sustaining peaceful coexistence” (Guinn, 757). Guinn
argues that the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the “foundation of freedom,
justice, and peace in the world” (757). HRL works toward the same goals as the goals of legal
“peace” implicitly. Its effect is to advance the cause of peace.
The UDHR is customary law but it is placed together with other human rights IL to
illustrate a soft law trend evident in the “promulgation in recent years of a wide variety of quasilegal instruments, from industry codes of conduct to guidelines issued by international
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organizations to achieve multiple and varied purposes” (Dunoff et al, p. 74; the art of soft law
becoming customary law, Dunoff et al, p. 81). Customary norms are relevant to human rights
law since a norm is binding by influence on all states whether party to an instrument or not
(Meron, 1989). Although subject to some criticism, as Meron discusses, human rights law is an
example of norms being accepted as obligatory though all states do not yet agree.
Since 1863 there have been 779 human rights instruments according to Michael Elliott’s
dataset (2011) so I will not list them here. These instruments show a correlation with the
international peace movement. The goals of the peacemaking processes such as the one in Sierra
Leone “reflect human rights of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (Kumar 2010). HR
is a” means of social change” which can help bring about the condition of peace (Guinn, 2016,
756). The emerging consensus is “that protecting HR represents a key strategy in the larger effort
to promote and maintain peace in which each domain contributes in its own way to the whole”
(Guinn, 2018, at 774). Furthermore, HR “seeks to empower the individual in relation to the
state” (p.756).
Michael Ignatieff asserts that human rights as an idea is “synonymous with civilization”
(2001). A definition of “Civilization” is “the stage of human social development and organization
which is considered most advanced” (Oxford Dictionary). Human rights law is by concept
inextricably entangled with human social development and organization. HR law is a vital
pathway to world peace and peace law, but also is an invaluable tool for bringing peace law to
the domestic state level.
19.2 Responsibility to Protect (R2)
The “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) is a soft law norm that may with time rise to
customary law status. The effects of it indirectly contribute to the maintenance or restoration of
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peace by interventions calculated to prevent or end large scale crimes against humanity and the
illicit use of force. In the early 2000s R2P seemed to be leading work toward a norm of peace,
but the Human Right to Peace from the UN General Assembly may be a stronger tool now. The
Syrian and Yemen Civil Wars have presented insurmountable issues for trying to protect the
citizens of both states by R2P. In theory, with SC approval, action to protect civilian populations
pursuant to R2P may succeed. Furthermore, R2P’s existence illustrates developmental changes
in IL. The previously perceived absolute sovereignty of states is subject to R2P now, if invoked
by the SC.18 Suffice it to say that globalization and world governance is creating an international
web whereby states are ceding portions of their sovereignty for various benefits of joining the
international community. R2P is but one example of the trend19.
19.3
20

Evolution of Actors Creating “Peace” law: Those Who Have Access to the System
The identity of law-making actors has implications for the IL of peace. The role of
actor has expanded from states alone in the Westphalian system to multiple levels of actors
today even though states are still primary actors. NGOs have taken part in panel discussions,
round table meetings, lobbying, monitoring treaty processes, insisting on state
accountability, naming and shaming for non-compliance, and encouraging states to become
parties to treaties and soft law instruments (Boyle and Chinkin, 2007, p. 81). (2007 p. 93).
NGOs, the SC and other international actors are inextricably involved in influencing IL and
by participating are influencing the IL of peace.

18

The issue of sovereignty has an entire body of literature on it and is too extensive to address here.
Walling Hall’s article International Law and the Responsibility to Protect contains an excellent review of the
literature on the topic of R2P including the debates on its status (guiding principle or norm or customary IL if
regularly invoked? etc.), when and how it might be invoked to support military intervention, and how it emerged
(Hall 2009 p. 13).
19
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21

Today the trend is “towards more flexible and less hierarchical modes of cooperation”
and “informalisation” in IL (referring to comments by Christopher Daise, Nolte 2008).
NGOs are building state practice, strengthening norms and moving states toward new
norms, in the case of this paper, toward a norm of peace. Where no international procedures
existed, NGOs have sought their introduction. When excluded from the law-making
process, NGOs have initiated their own process by developing texts, codes of conduct,
guidelines and interpretive treaty commentaries, often “in the hope they will be adopted by
other international actors” (2007, p. 89). While Boyle and Chinkin admit that “the actual
influence NGOs have had on the development of IL is empirically uncertain”, they “have a
catalytic effect. They bring issues onto the international agenda.”

22

The end of the Cold War and 9/11 brought “new security risks and challenges that could
no longer be met by existing security institutions” and “when institutional reform is unlikely
or too slow, states or groups of states tend to act outside of those institutions and to create –
willingly or not – new ones which are better-(or seemingly better-) suited to cope with
emerging threats” (Nolte 2008 p. 180). Hanqin Xue, a member of the International Law
Commission, adds that there is “unprecedentedly broad participation and representation in
the international law-making process”, and “proliferation of international institutions”
(Nolte p. 183; law-making by international organizations, Johnston, 2013; the power of nongovernmental organizations to affect international law-making, Spiro, 2013; the impact of
non-state actors, Falk, 2006; the increased ability of institutions to engage “with and around
legal norms, Chinkin and Kaldor, 2017, Ch. 3; the role of non-state actors, Boyle and
Chinkin, 2007; the profound changes to IL due to issues, people and institutions affected by
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it, its connection to “sub-national institutions, IOs, non-state actors and individuals,” Ku,
2012, Ch. 5).
23

A “heavy reliance on soft law” as a “strategy of legalization” exists now (Abbott and
Snidal 2012). Non-state actors are engaged in “regulatory standard-setting” although not in
the security context (Abbott and Snidal 2012). Prost and Clark discuss IOs as shapers of IL
(2006). McDougal emphasizes that a “law relevant to peace” must include “all the various
roads to peace” such as “international governmental organizations, third-party decision
making, the facilitation and protection of diplomacy and negotiation, conflict resolution, the
organization of deterrence, the management of collective security, and so on” (1989, p.5).

24

Perhaps most importantly, several scholars speak of the role of the Security Council
becoming more like a legislative role, particularly in relation to its responsibility to
determine whether threats to international peace and security exist and choices to send
peacekeeping operations to states (binding acts of the SC as IL, Maus 2014 p. 683, citing
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n 63rd Sess., Apr. 26-June 3, July 4-Aug. 12, 2011, U.N.doc.
A/66/10 para.87).
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There is “undoubtedly a growing practice towards, and expectation of NGO
participation at the UN” as the relationship evolves (Boyle and Chinkin 2007 p.52). NGO
participation depends on rules of procedure for the organization or treaty in question. Boyle
and Chinkin rhetorically ask: “Is this democratizing IL making?” and answer “The
expression of a cosmopolitan, popular will through NGO voice – the ‘conscience of the
world’ – is itself seen by some as a basis of legitimacy” (p.58). The opposite view is that
NGO participation is “a degradation of the technical work of international lawyers in the
face of pressure groups and a side-stepping of exiting international law requirements and
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procedures” and that NGOs are not always transparent, may not be democratic, may be selfappointed with their own agendas, and may have evangelical/or elitist zeal (Boyle and
Chinkin 2007 p.58). The fact remains that the role of these actors is affecting legalization of
international peace law.
25.1 Role of Courts Affecting Peace Law
International courts have the delegated authority to interpret and apply rules of IL
respecting peace law which means helping shape what that law is. Through their enforcement of
the laws of peace they strengthen it also. International court judgments assist in building the IL
of peace by articulating guidelines for states to follow, and by clarifying ambiguous or undefined
provisions in the law as applied to certain facts. References to the Nicaragua Cases and the
Congo Case herein are illustrative of what the ICJ has contributed to peace law. Creation of the
ICC has facilitated peace by providing enforcement against crimes perpetrated by individuals
against the peace and security of peoples. State consent to the the ICC has been problematic, but
the ICC moved the legalization process of peace forward by delegation of authority to third
parties for enforcement. Enforcement of IL is not the issue addressed herein, but the delegation
of authority to third parties is one criteria of legalization and is important itself. International
tribunals also have a soft law impact on the legalization process (Guzman and Meyer 2008). The
fact that the ICC has successfully operated and still exists after 16 years fuels hope for its role in
future development of peace law.
26

The Nuremberg Tribunal paved the way for court involvement in peace efforts.

Hathaway and Shapiro’s discussion of the legal issues of creating that tribunal and allowing it to
prosecute individuals for crimes of war is an interesting story illustrating the shift from IL that
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allowed any conduct toward people during a “just” war to the position that if war was not “just”
then the perpetrators are responsible for their complicity in what the state did (2017).
27

The Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg contributed to the

hard law of peace by creating jurisdiction of the court over “crimes against peace” and throwing
a wide net to deal with those who contributed to the atrocities of World War II. “Aggression”
was not yet defined, but Nuremburg is considered an important milepost in the development of
crimes against peace and the crime of aggression. Its Charter provides as follows:
II: JURISDICTION AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Art. 6. The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to in
Article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the major war
criminals of the European Axis countries shall have the power to
try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the European
Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of
organizations, committed any of the following crimes.
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there
shall be individual responsibility:
(a) ' Crimes against peace: ' namely, planning, preparation,
initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in
a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the
foregoing;
(b) ' War crimes: ' namely, violations of the laws or customs of
war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder,
ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose
of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or illtreatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of
hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction
of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military
necessity;
(c) ' Crimes against humanity.- ' namely, murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during the war, or
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution
of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the
country where perpetrated.
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in
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the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to
commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts
performed by any persons in execution of such plan
(http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/350?OpenDocument 4/8/2011).
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The documents founding the ICTY and the ICTR and the action of the tribunals
advanced legal development of the IL of peace. SC Resolution 827 (1993) creating the
power and jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) not
only gave the tribunal jurisdiction to prosecute genocide and crimes against humanity, but
also created individual culpability in persons who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or
otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of the crimes, and
specifically denied heads of state or government or other government officials the right of
immunity from responsibility20. SC Resolution 955 (1994) creating the tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) referenced the threat to international peace and security, and pursuant to Chapter VII
of the UN Charter authorized that tribunal to prosecute genocide, defined the same as in the
ICTY Resolution. Jurisdiction also included prosecution for: b) Conspiracy to commit
genocide; c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; d) Attempt to commit

20

Genocide in the ICTY Resolution is defined as:
Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated
to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
(http://www.icls.de/dokumente/icty_statut.pdf 4//2011).
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genocide; e) Complicity in genocide, and crimes against
humanity.(http://www.unictr.org/AboutICTR/GeneralInformation/tabid/101/Default.aspx
4/8/2011.
29

The country specific international tribunals laid the legal developmental groundwork for
the ICC, clearly delegating IL enforcement capacity. In 1998 the Rome Statute, signed by
120 countries, created the court21 which entered into force in
2002(http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court /). The ICC is the first permanent
treaty-based international court with delegated authority to uphold international law. The
international crimes against peace set out in the Statute are hard law and the court has full
authority when a case comes before it. The significance of this court to international law is
still being discovered. The creation of the ICC has encouraged states to assert universal
jurisdiction themselves since the ICC jurisdiction is based on complementarity (Slye 2010).

21

The ICC Statute of Rome criminalized certain individual acts against humanity, reinforces the law against
aggression, and enforces IL respecting peace, humanitarian and human rights law. Prosecutable crimes against
humanity now include:
a. Murder,
b. Extermination,
c. Enslavement,
d. Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
e. Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of
fundamental rules of international law;
f. Torture, Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
g. Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial,
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other
grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law,
in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court;
h. Enforced disappearance of persons;
i. The crime of apartheid;
j. Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering,
or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.
(ICC Rome Statute Art. 7 (1)).
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30

Some effects of the court on peace are known. Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo had
the court issue arrest warrants for individuals charged with mass crimes in Sudan, Uganda,
the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Muammar Ghaddafi. Word spread that there was
justice beyond warlords. Public perception began to change (Crossette, 2010). MorenoOcampo said that even before a formal trial opened, the case of Lubanga had an impact: “In
Nepal, 3,000 kids were released as soldiers because of the Lubanga case” (Crossette, 2010).
Another example of the impact of its existence is perhaps the report February 23, 2011 on
CNN that Libyan pilots refused to bomb oil fields south of Benghazi and instead ejected
from the plane (Tobruk, Libya CNN). Unfortunately, in the last few years, the court has
seemed to stall in effectiveness. That it is still functioning after 16 years continues the
prospect of accountability for those who commit crimes against international peace
strengthening the law of peace. When the Syria tragedy is over, it will be important to the
development of the IL of peace to have prosecution in the ICC for those responsible for
crimes against humanity and crimes against peace in Syria.

31

Domestic courts also play a role in affecting the IL of peace. Delegation of HR law
and peace law (against aggression and the use of force) to the domestic level strengthens
both laws and thus the result of conditions of peace under IL. HR law has proven a leader in
becoming part of state law. Beth Simmons (2009) reviews how domestic courts are
incorporating IL and thus spreading its impact. Two examples are Chile and Israel.
Simmons used the Convention Against Torture (CAT) to quantify levels of incorporation of
human rights law into domestic situations. Chile’s reputation regarding human rights was
not good. In 1987 the Chilean people voted by 87% to ratify Constitutional provisions
incorporating CAT into their Constitution. At first, Simmons finds, the state courts were
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reluctant to comply. By 1997, however, they were prosecuting torture cases in state courts
(p. 293) signifying full acceptance (a form of delegation) of the HR IL at the state level,
effectively utilizing IL to creating conditions conducive to peace within Chile. Israel
ratified CAT in 1991. Although results in Israel were not dramatic, the courts were
apparently used to help modify Israeli interrogation techniques (Simmons, 2009). The
bottom line is that state ratification of the international convention was associated with
“significant improvements in torture practices” (2009). Delegation worked to formalize IL
affecting peace at the state level.
32

HR treaties became the source for HR law once incorporated in Argentina (Jackson,
Tolley and Volcansek, 2010). Anne-Marie Slaughter generally advocates incorporation of IL
into state law for enforcement by state courts as a means of developing IL. She quotes J.
Sinclair Armstrong, Professor of International, Foreign and Comparative Law at Harvard
Law School:
National courts are the vehicles through which international treaties and
customary law that have not been independently incorporated into domestic
statutes enter domestic legal systems.
(Slaughter, 1999-2000).

The body of IL gains legal authority when it is incorporated into domestic systems. The effect is
to strengthen progressive development of IL.

The Development of Jus Post Bellum
33

A category of jus post bellum is being created (Stahn 2008; Maus 2014), emerging from just
war theory (Maus 2014). This law has to do with creating conditions where peaceful
conditions after conflict may be sustained. Moving areas post conflict into conditions
conducive to long term peace will be an effect of these laws. There is not yet agreement on
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“jus post bellum principles” (Maus, p. 678) but the concept is a grouping of “rules necessary
for a sustainable transition from conflict to stable and lasting peace” (Maus, p. 678; See also
Allison 2018; Stahn 2006; See also Stahn, 2008). The recent Peacebuilding Commission under
the UN and a history of peacekeeping and now peacebuilding operations are contributing to
the growth of best practices for building peace. As they do, standard successful practices for
creating stability after conflict are developing.

At the same time, new international

agreements are recognizing responsibility for human security (Stahn p. 323). Human rights
are central to peacekeeping and building efforts and is part of the jus post bellum concept
(Maus, 2014, citing United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines).
Regional organizations are becoming central players in peace efforts. Laws setting rules for
building conditions conducive to peace, facilitating those conditions, and setting rules for
human rights and security are more likely to be more substantive and directive than the general
UN Charter mandate to maintain international peace and security. Again, time will tell as the
development of the law of peace and laws affecting peace goes on.
3

CONCLUSION

33.1
34

All peace law per se in Part 1 is found to be legalized and binding except the Human
Right to Peace which is legalized but non-binding so far. The IL of peace is defined by UN
Charter requirements. The UN Charter Preamble and Art. 1(1), Art. 2(3) require states to
settle disputes by peaceful means. Art. 2(4) requires states to refrain from the illegal threat
or use of force. We have seen that legalization requires obligation, precision, and delegation.
These Charter provisions represent legal obligations, they are precise enough to set clear
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standards for conduct, and authority to resolve issues relating to them has been delegated by
Art. 31, 34, 41 and Chapter 7 Art. 42 to the Security Council.
35

Jus ad bellum is customary IL involving the use of force and aggression leading to war.
The law governing use of force is UN Charter 2(4) above. The Rome Statute as amended
makes aggression a crime. The only force or threat of force that is legal under the UN
Charter is when force is used for self-defense. We have shown that whether self-defense
is/was appropriate is determined by the SC, or, in retrospect, by the ICJ based on the facts of
the case. The obligation not to use force is precise enough for states to understand the
standard. Delegation of the issue of use of force (aggression if it is unauthorized use of
force) to the SC and aggression to the ICC has occurred. Therefore, the law regarding force
and aggression is fully legalized.

36

The 1970 Declaration of Friendly Relations Between States is declared to be principles of
IL by its terms, and it is soft peace law per se, but as a declaration it reiterates the purposes
of the UN Charter and Art. 1 of the UN. Therefore, it may be binding both as customary
law and by its connection to the Charter. Precision and delegation are the same as for the
UN Charter provisions.

37 The Human Right to Peace was declared by the UN General Assembly and so is a soft law
that is of yet unbinding. It represents an obligation of law but is not precisely defined
although a standard for definition could be used, and no complete delegation to a third party
has specifically occurred. However, the SC does have authority to make determinations if a
threat to international peace and security has occurred so that a major violation of the human
right to peace could come within the authority of the SC.
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38

In Part 2 we have considered laws that do not mandate peace per se, but that require
behaviors that indirectly result in peace. The VCLT is treaty law fully legalized by
obligation, precision and to some extent, delegation, affecting treaties and thus peaceful
relations between states. All relevant treaty regimes in IL minimize conflict and disputes
and so affect peace. In positive law treaties and conventions addressing specific areas of IL
channel state behavior so that the potential for or actual armed conflict is avoided. Each
regime would have to be analyzed for extent of legalization and the degrees of legalization
of regimes will vary, primarily due to precision and delegation. Nevertheless, regimes are
usually recognized as legal obligations in IL. Human rights laws and humanitarian laws
whether by treaty or jus cogens affect conditions of peace. Human rights laws help reduce
sources of conflict and humanitarian laws help improve conditions for people in conflict.
Both are often not fully legalized despite the existence of obligations, because delegation
and precision are not developed enough. R2P is a soft law norm that affects peace. The
authority of international actors and institutions by emerging customary law is creating and
interpreting IL and thereby affecting peace.
The review identifies how peace is the ultimate purpose of all international law. Legally,

peace is the absence of the illegal threat or use of force, including armed conflict, and the
presence of or commitment to conditions under which fundamental human rights: the dignity and
worth of the human person, the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small,
and justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international
law can be maintained. That purpose frames our understanding of all IL.
IL either directly requires conditions of peace per se or it indirectly affects peace and
conditions of peace. IL creates mechanisms to assist in efforts to channel state behavior. It
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creates certainty in expectations regarding state behaviors and clarity about state obligations on
the world stage. Ultimately in any area of IL, states are required to settle all their disputes,
commercial, security, criminal and environmental, by peaceful means and promote conditions
favorable to fundamental human rights.

Commented [WU6]: You must have a reference, works cited, or
bibliography section with at least two entries before I can approve
your document.

REFERENCES
Abbott, Kenneth W., Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter and
Duncan Snidal (2000). “The Concept of Legalization”. International Organization Vol.
54 p. 401-420.
Abbott, Kenneth W. and Duncan Snidal (2012). “Law, Legalization and Politics: An Agenda for
the Next Generation of International Relation – International Law”. In Interdisciplinary
Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art.
Dunnoff, Jeffrey L. and Mark Pollack, Ed. 2013. NY: Cambridge University Press.
Advisory Committee takes note of the progress report on the right to peace (21
AEDIDH. http://www.aedidh.org/?q=node/1895

January 2011).

Ago, Roberto (1957). “Positive Law and International Law”. American Journal of International
Law, Vol. 51 (4), pp 691-733. https://doi.org/10.2307/2195350
A/HRC/RES/30/12 Promotion of the right to peace. 1 October 2015.
A/HRC/RES/32/28 Declaration on the Right to Peace. 1 July 2016.
A/GA/RES/33/73. Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace. 15 December
1978.
Allison, Jennifer (2018). “Program on International law and Armed Conflict”. Harvard law
School Library.
A/RES/29/3314 with Annex; G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 31, at 142,
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974). See also:
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/GAres3314.html
A/RES/60/1 World Summit Outcome 2005.
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/glob
alcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf

54

A/RES/2625. 1970 Declaration of Friendly States.
A/RES/71/189, 19 December 2016. Adopting “Declaration on the Right to Peace”.
Art. 8 Amendment to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on
the Crime of
Aggression (2010). U. N. Reference: C.N.651.2010.TREATIES-8 (Depositary
Notification). https://asp.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/AMENDMENTS/CN.651.2010-ENGCoA.pdf .
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda 19
December 2005) ICJ Reports.
Armstrong, David, Editor (2009). Routledge Handbook of International Law.
OXON: Routledge.

Abingdon,

Alger, C. F. Ed. (1998). The Future of the United Nations System: Potential for
first Century. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

the Twenty-

Alston, Philip (1980). “Peace as a Human Right”. Security Dialogue Vol. 11 (4) pp319-329. Oct.
Art. 38(1) Statute of the ICJ;
Augustine (354-430 CE). “Augustine: Political and Social Philosophy.” IEP, A Peer Reviewed
Academic Source. https://www.iep.utm.edu/aug-poso/
Austin 1920. Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law (abr. by R. Campbell,
thirteenth impr, London, 1920), part I, sec. I, introductory, p. 5.
Bailliet, Cecilia M. and Kjetil M. Larsen (2015). Promoting Peace Through International Law.
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Beck, R. J., Anthony Clark Arend, and Robert D. Vander Lugt (1996).
International Rules:
Approaches from International Law and International
Relations. NY: Oxford
University Press.
Beck, Robert J. (2009). “International Law and International Relations
Scholarship” in
Routledge Handbook of International Law, David Armstrong, Editor. 2009. Abingdon,
OXON: Routledge.
Beck, Ulrich (1992). Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Sage Publications.
Beck, Ulrich (2005). Power in the Global Age. Malden (MA): Polity Press.

55

Begum, Afroza (2014). “Dowry in Bangladesh: A Search from an International Perspective for
an Effective Legal Approach to Mitigate Women’s Experiences.” Journal of
International Women’s Studies Vol. 15, (2) July 2014.
Bélanger, Louis and Kim Fontaine-Skronski (2012). “Legalization’ in International Relations: A
Conceptual Analysis.” Sage Journals Vol. 51, 2: 238-262.
www.Journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0539018412437110
Benjamin, D. (2009). “Last Resort: Bridging Protection and Prevention.” International Journal
on World Peace, Vol. 26, Iss. 4, Dec. 2009. New York.
Black’s Law Dictionary (1968). St. Paul, MN: West Publishing.
Boyle, A. and Chinkin, C. (2007). The Making of International Law. NY: Oxford
University Press.

Buchanon, Allen (2004) citing Moore, J. (1906). A Digest of International Law (8 vols.).
Washington DC : U. S. Government Printing Office.

Buchanon, Allen (2004). Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for
International Law. New York: Oxford University Press.
Campbell, K. J. (2009). Genocide
Carey, H. ( ) Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.
Carreno, Edmundo Vargas (2009). “Address”. Peace Through International Law: The Role of
the International Law Commission.
Charney, Jonathan I (1993). “Universal International Law”. Am.J.I.L.87: 547.
Chatfield, C. (1979). International Peace Research: The Field Defined by
Dissemination, ISSN 0022-3433 Journal of Peace Research Vol. XVI, No. 2, (1979)
URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/423710 Retrieved on 10/23/2010.
Chesterman, Simon (2001). Just WAR or Just PEACE? Humanitarian Intervention and
International Law. Great Britain: Oxford University Press.
Chesterman, Simon (2010). Dialogue with Member States organized by the Rule of Law Unit:
“The UN Security Council and the rule of law, Keynote Address”. 28 October 2010.
Dag Hammarskjöld Library Penthouse, United Nations Headquarters.
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw

56

Chesterman, Simon (2014). “Humanitarian Intervention and R2P” in International
Organizations and Global Governance, Weiss, Thomas G. and Rorden Wilkinson, Ed.
NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
Chinkin, Christine and Mary Kaldor (2017). International Law and New Wars. UK: Cambridge
University Press.
Chowdhury, A. (January 30, 2009). Promoting Peace as a Human Right.
http://www.globalvisioninstitute.org/a-chowdhury-on-peace-as-human-right-.html
(Also, Mr. Chowdhury has recently posted a speech on YouTube regarding
Peace
as a Human Right).
Churchill, Winston 1939 Radio Broadcast. October 1939.
Cicero, 37, 130. “Partitiones Oratoriae”. De Officiis 3, 17.69, in Colish, The Stoic Tradition, p.
150.
CNN: Reports: Libyan pilots refuse to bomb city, eject from plane (2/23/2011).
Codification of the human right to peace. Human Rights Council Advisory Committee Fourth
session 25-29 January 2010, Item 3 (b) of the provisional agenda. A/HRC/AC/4/NGO/3.
Cohen, N. S. and Otterman, S. (3/2/2011). “Migrant Workers Pile Up at Libya’s Borders”. New
York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/world/africa/03refugee.html?ref
Cohen, R. (3/28/2011). Arabs Will Be Free. New York Times.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/opinion/29iht-edcohen29.html?
Collins, E. Jr. Ed.(1970). International Law in a Changing World: Cases, Documents, and
Readings. New York: Random House.
Consultation on the Human Right to Peace with civil society: activists, academics and lawyers
(22 March 2011). AEDIDH. http://www.aedidh.org/?q=node/1904
Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/jurisprudence
Retrieved 3/18/2018.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/opinio_juris_international_law
Covenant of the League of Nations (1924).
http://www.firstworldwar.com/source/leagueofnations.htm
Cranston, M. (1973). What Are Human Rights? NY: Taplinger Publishing Co., Inc.
Cronin, B. (2009). New Trends in Treaty Law," The International Studies
Encyclopedia: International Studies Association Compendium Project. Malden, MA:
Blackwell.

57

Crossette, B. (10/27/2010). Judging the War Crimes Tribunal. The Nation.
http://www.thenation.com

Current Concerns: Journal for independent thought, ethical standards, moral responsibility and
for the promotion and respect of public
international law, human rights and
humanitarian law, No. 6, 2007. October 14, 2010. UN Round Table on the Human
Right to Peace. http://www.currentconcerns.ch/index.php?id=299 Retrieved on
10/13/2010.
D’Amato, Anthony (2009). “International Law as a Unitary System,” in Routledge
Handbook of International Law, David Armstrong, Editor, 2009. Abingdon:
OXON: Routledge.
DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW FRIENDLY RELATIONS
AND CO-OPERATION AMONG STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. (GA/RES/2625)
http://www.hku.edu/law/conlawhk/conlaw/outline/Outline4/2625.htm
retrieved 10/13/2010.
Department of the Army Pamphlet (September 1979). “Law of Peace, Volume 1”. 27-161-1.
Diehl, Paul F. and Charlotte Ku (2010). The Dynamics of International Law. NY: Cambridge
University Press.
Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Mankind (Part I).
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/7_3.htm Retrieved on 10/31/2010.
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of mankind (Part II) – including the draft
Statute for an international criminal court. http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/7_4.htm
Retrieved 10/31/2010.
Dunoff, J. L., Ratner, S. R. and Wippman, D. (2010). International Law Norms, Actors, Process:
A Problem-Oriented Approach. NY: Aspen Publishers.
Dunoff, Jeffrey L. and Mark A. Pollack, Ed. (2013). Interdisciplinary Perspectives on
International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art. New York: NY,
Cambridge University Press.
Elliott, Michael A. (2011). “The Institutional Expansion of Human Rights, 1863-2003: A
Comprehensive dataset of international instruments. “Journal of Peace Research 48 (4)
537-546.

58

Emizet, K. N.F. (2000). The Massacre of Refugees in Congo: A case of UN Peacekeeping
Failure and International Law. The Journal of African Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Jul.,
2000), pp. 163-202. Published by: Cambridge University Press. Stable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/161648 Retrieved on 24/10/2010.
Engstrom, Par. (2010). “Human Rights: Effectiveness of International and Regional
Mechanisms”. Online Publication Date: Dec 2017
DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.214

Falk, R. (2006). International Law and the Future. Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 5,
Reshaping Justice: International Law and the Third World (2006). Pp. 727-737.
Taylor & Francis, Ltd. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4017774 Retrieved:
24/10/2010.
Feichner, Isabel (2011). “Review” of The Function of Law in the International Community by
Hersch Lauterpacht. Eur. J. I. L., Vol. 22(4), pp 1177-1179.
Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink (1998). “International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change”. International Organization 52, 4, Autumn 1998.
From War to Peace, (2017). International Law Commission. UN Library. https://read.unilibrary.org
GA A/51/395, 23 September 1996.
GA/RES/2625. 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations Among States.
Gates, S., Gleditsch, N. P. and Hegre, H. (2004). Towards a Global Civil Peace. Centre for the
Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).
http://www.prio.no/sptrans/-18161177/file45234_un_foundation.pdf
Geneva Protocol of 1925.
Geneva Conventions 1949. https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customarylaw/geneva-conventions
Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind (2010). http://www.enotes.com/genocide- encyclopedia/code-crimes-againstpeace-security-mankind Retrieved 10/14/2010.
Goldsmith, Jack L. and Eric A. Posner (2005). The Limits of International Law. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. 262.

59

Goldstein, Judith, J. M. Kahler, R. O. Keohane, and Anne-Marie Slaughter (2002).
“Introduction.” Legalization and World Politics.
Gray, Christine (1994). “The Principle of Non-Use of Force” in The United Nations and the
Principle of International Law, Lowe and Warbrick, eds. (1994), 33.
Gray, Christine (2008). International Law and the Use of Force. Oxford: England. Oxford
University Press. p. 887-917.
Green, Michael Steven (2003). “Hans Kelsen and the Logic of Legal Systems”. Faculty
Publications. Paper 173. http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/173
Grotius Hugo (1625). On the Law of War and Peace.
Guzman, Andrew T. and Timothy L. Meyer (2010). “International Soft Law”. Journal of Legal
Analysis Vol. 2, 1, March p. 171-225.
Guzman, Andrew T. and Timothy L. Meyer (2008). “International Common Law: The Soft Law
of International Tribunals.” 9 Chi. J. Int'l L. 515.
Guzman, Andrew T. (2005). “Reputation and international Law”. 34 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L.
379.
Guinn, David E. (2018). “Human Rights as Peacemaker: An Integrative Theory of International
Human Rights.” Human Rights Quarterly Vol. 38 (3) pp 754-786.
Guinness World Records. http://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/world-records/highest-deathtoll-from-wars/
Hagan, J. (2010). “Regime Type, Foreign Policy and International Relations”. International
Studies Encyclopedia. DOI:10.1111/b.9781444336597.2010.x
Hagan, J. and Levi, R. (2005). Crimes of War and the Force of Law. Social Forces, Vol. 83, No.
4 (Jun., 2005), pp. 1499-1534. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3598402
Retrieved on 24/10/2010.
Hague Peace Conference of 1899 and Convention of 1899
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBV0005494/geldigheidsdatum_23-05-2013
Hague Convention of 1907.
Hall, B. W. (2009). “International Law and the Responsibility to Protect” in The International
Studies Encyclopedia, Ed. R. A. Denemark. Blackwell Reference Online.
www.isacompendium.com.

60

Handler, Stephenie Gosnell (2012). “The New Cyber Face of Battle: Developing a
Legal
Approach to Accommodate Emerging Trends in Warfare.” Stanford
J. Int’l L. 48 p.
209-237 (2012).
Hathaway, Oona and Scott J. Shapiro (2017). The Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to
Outlaw War Remade the World. New York: Simons and Schuster.
Haythornthwaite, Philip J. (1996). The World War One Source Book. Arms and Armour Press.
Pp 382-383.
Hillebrecht, Courtney (2016). “The Deterrent Effects of the International Criminal Court:
Evidence from Libya”. International Interactions.Sep-Oct2016, Vol. 42 (4), pp616-643.
Hoffman, Stanley (1961). “International Systems and International Law”. World Politics, Vol. 14
(1) pp 205-237. Cambridge University Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2009562
Hoffman, Stanley (2017). “The Uses and Limits of International Law” in International Politics,
13th Edition. Art, Robert J. and Robert Jervis, Ed.
Howe, W. History of the Internet. http://www.walthowe.com/navnet/history.html
Retrieved 3/29/2011.
Human Rights Council Advisory Committee 29 July 2010 Background Release.
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID= 10237&LangI
D=E Retrieved on 10/13/2010.
Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, 25-29 January 2010. A/HRC/AC/4/NGO/3.
Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, 6 August 2010.
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID= 10259&LangI
D=E Retrieved on 10/13/2010.
Hurd, Ian (2014). “Is Humanitarian Intervention Legal? The Rule of Law in an incoherent
World,” in Essential Readings in World Politics, 5th Edition. Mingst, Karen A. and Jack
L. Snyder, Ed. NY: Norton.
ICC: Bolster Global Justice at Kampala Conference. May 10, 2010. Human Rights Watch.
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/05/10/icc-golster-global-justice-kampala-conference
ICC Review Conference of the Rome Statute. http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=review
ICC Review Conference: Kampala 2010 (2010). http//iccreviewconference.globspot.com
ICJ: Statute of the International Court of Justice. http://www.icj-cij.org/en/statute

61

ICC Review Conference concludes in Kampala 14 Jun 2010. The Hague Justice Portal.
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/11/779.html
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia. SC Resolution 827 (1993)
Ignatieff, Michael (2001). In Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, ed. Amy Gutmann.
ICRC. International Committee of the Red Cross, Treaties, States Parties and Commentaries.
ILC: Question of Defining Aggression. 12/20/2010.
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/7_5.htm
ILC: “Draft Declaration of Rights and Duties of States” in From War to Peace, (2017).
https://read.un-ilibrary.org
ILC: 1950 Session Report. http://www.un.org/law/ilc
ILC: Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal and
in the Judgment of the Tribunal (1950). Retrieved 10/31/2010. ILC site.
International Court of Justice, Statute of, Art. 38 (1)(b).
ILC: Special Rapporteur, Draft 3 27 May 2015. (Official Records of the General Assembly,
Seventieth Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/70/10, para 286).
Legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/reports/2016/English/chp5.pdf&lang=EFSTAC
International Criminal Court, Rome Statute for, 1998 including the Kampala Amendments in
2010.
“International Law and Justice”. https://un.org

International Law Commission: Fragmentation of International Law: difficulties arising from
the diversification and expansion of international law.
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/1_9.htm Retrieved on 10/31/2010.
International Law Commission (2 May-10 June and 4 July-12 August 2016). “Report of the
International Sixty-Eighth Session” Chapter V Identification of customary international
law. http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/reports/2016/english/chp5.pdf&lang=EFSRAC
International Law Commission (2 May-10 June and 4 July-12 August 2016). “Report of the
International Sixty-Eighth Session” Chapter IX Jus Cogens.
http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/reports/2016/english/chp5.pdf&lang=EFSRAC
Jackson, Donald W., Michael C. Tolley and Mary L. Volcansek (2010). “Judicial Globalization:
How the International Law of Human Rights Changed the Argentine Supreme Court” in

62

Globalizing Justice: Critical Perspectives on Transnational Law and the Cross-Border
Migration of Legal Norms, 255-266. Albany: State University of NY Press.
Jenkins, Rob (June 2008). UN Peacebuilding Commission and the Dissemination of
International Norms, Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, City University of
New York, Working Paper 38 –Regional
and
Global Axes of Conflict- ISSN 17491800.
Jenkins, Rob (2013). Peacebuilding: From Concept to Commission. NY: Routledge.
Johnstone, Ian (2013).“ Law-Making by International Organizations: Perspectives from IL/IR
Theory”, in Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International
Relations: The State of the Art, Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack Editors. NY:
Cambridge University Press.
Judgment, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Uganda 19 December 2005. ICJ. http://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/116/judgments .
Kammerhofer, J. (2011). Uncertainty in International Law: A Kelsenian
Routledge.

perspective. NY:

Kammerhofer, Jörg (2015). “Positivism”. Oxford Bibliographies. DOI:
10.1093/OBO/9780199796953-0059, AUGUST 31, 2015.
http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo9780199796953-0059.xml
Kampala Conference (2010). (http://iccreviewconference.glogspot.com ;
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/02/opinion/02iht-edscheffer.html?). New Art. 8(1) of
Rome Statute.
Kampala Definition of Aggression (2010).
https://asp.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf
Kaplan, Morton A. and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach (1961). The Political Foundations of
International Law. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Kapp, Marshall B. (2013). “A Legal Approach to the Use of Human Biological
Research Purposes.” Rutgers J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 10 (1) (2013).

Materials for

Kaya, Gözde (2015). “A New Era in peacekeeping for the United Nations: Leaving traditional
peacekeeping behind.” J.Econ. & Mgmt Vol. 20(A) 2015, ISSN 1732-1948.
Kellogg-Briand Pact 1928. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kbpact.asp
See also: https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/political-science-andgovernment/international-organizations/kellogg-briand

63

Kelsen, Hans (1952). Principles of International Law. The Law Book Exchange, Ltd.
Kelsen, Hans (1944). Peace Through International Law.
Koh, Harold (1997). “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” Yale Law Journal Vol. 106, p.
2599.
Koskenniemi, Martti (1990). “The Politics of International Law.” E.J.I.L.1990 (4).
Ejil.org/pdfs/1/1/1144.pdf
Koskenniemi, M. (2009). “The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later”. The
European Journal of International Law Vol. 20 no. 1, 7-19.
Koremenos, Barbara (2013). “Institutionalism and International Law” in Interdisciplinary
perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art,
Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack Editors. NY: Cambridge University Press.
Kristoff, N. D. (2/26/2011). Unfit for Democracy? New York Times.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/27/opinion/27kristof.html?ref=egyp
Ku, Charlotte (2012). International Law, International Relations, and Global Governance. NY:
Routledge.
Kumar, T. (2010). “United Nations peace process as a peacemaking and human rights exercise.
Lessons from conflict resolution in Sierra Leone”. Crime, Law & Social Change Vol. 54
(5) pp 303-323.
Lauterpacht, Sir Hersch (1933, 2011). The Function of Law in the International Community.
New York: Oxford University Press.
League of Nations 1920. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp See also:
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006AC19C/(httpPages)/17C8E6BCE10E3F4F80256EF
30037D733?OpenDocument
Lees, M. (2004). The Prospects for Peace in the 21st Century. Statement by Mr. Martin Lees,
Rector of the University for Peace to the International Politics Society, University of St.
Andrews, 4th May 2004. http://www.upeace.org
Linderfalk, Ulf (2007). The Effect of Jus Cogens Norms: Whoever Opened Pandora’s box, Did
You Ever Think About the Consequences? The European Journal of International Law Vol. 18
no. 5, 853-871.
Luarca Declaration on the Human Right to Peace.
http://www.nodo50.org/csca/agenda09/misc/pdf/DerechoHumanoPazingle s.pdf
Retrieved on 12/18/2010.

64

Madre News, (2/1/2010). Codification of the Human Right to Peace (Statement for the Human
Rights Council, Session, 13). http://www.madre.org/index/press-room4/news/codification-of-the-human-right-to-peace-330.html Retrieved on
10/13/2010.
Malanczuk, Peter (1997). Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to international Law, 7th Ed. New
York, NY: Routledge.
Meron, Theodore (1989). Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law. Great
Britain: Oxford University Press.
Maus, Sylvia (2014). “Jus Post Bellum Á LA UNITED NATIONS? HUMAN RIGHTS, UN
PEACE OPERATIONS, AND THE CREATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW”.
Wisconsin International Law Journal, Vol. 32 (4) pp 675-699.
McBane, James, P. (1943). “The Rule Against Disturbing Plain Meaning of Writings.” 31 (2)
Cal.L.R. 143, Art. 2. http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/californiareview/vol31/iss2/2
McDougal, Myres S. (1989). “Law and Peace.” Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series,
Paper #2656. Den. J. International Law and Policy Vol. 18:1 p. 1.
Mills, Kurt and C. O’Driscoll, C. “From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to
Protect” in The International Studies Encyclopedia, ed. Robert A. Denemark and
Renee Marlin-Bennett. (London: Wiley- Blackwell), p. 2532-52. Retrieved
2015. Current Online Version: 2017 DOI: 10.1093/acref/9780191842665.001.0001
Middleton, Carl (2016). Book Review of The Mekong: A Socio-Legal Approach to River Basin
Development . Boer, Ben, Philip Hirsch, Fleur Johns, Ben Saul, and Natalia Scurrah.
NY: Earthscan-Routledge. In Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, Sept. 2016,
Vol. 37 (3) p. 437-440.
Morgenthau, H. J. (1948). Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th Ed.,
NY: Alfred A. Knopf.
Murphy, Sean D. (2013). “JUS AD BELLUM, Values and the Contemporary Structure of
International Law”. Journal of Religious Ethics Vol. 41 (1) pp.20-26.
Nau, H. R. (2007). Perspectives on International Relations: Power, Institutions,
Washington D.C.: CQ Press,

and Ideas.

Najafizada, E. and Nordland, R. (4/1/2011). Afghans Avenge Florida Koran Burning, Killing 12.
New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/02/world/asia/02afghanistan.html?

65

Nicaragua Case. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua, Nicaragua v. United States of America. ICJ Reports 1986.
New York Times (3/31/2011). Egypt News-Revolution and Aftermath.
Nieto-Navia, R. (2001, The Hague). INTERNATIONAL PEREMPTORY NORMS
(JUS
COGENS) AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW.
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/WritingColombiaEng.pdf Retrieved 10/13/2010.
Nolte, G. Ed. (2009). Peace Through International Law: The Role of the International Law
Commission. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer.
Nuremburg, Charter of the International Military Tribunal.
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp
North Sea Continental Shelf Case, 20 February 1969. Judgement. ICJ. http://www.icjcij.org/files/case-related/51/5537.pdf
Oberg, Marko Divac (2006). “The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Secuirty Council and
General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ.” E.J.I.L. Vol. 16(5) 879-906.
O’Connell, Mary Ellen (2008). The Power and Purpose of International Law: Insights from the
Theory & Practice of Enforcement. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Pp 408.
ISBN: 9780195368949
O’Connell, Ellen 2013,2014). “Understanding the Higher Norm against Aggression”. Hersch
Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures. University of Cambridge.
https://sms.cam.ac.uk/media/1664077 .
Our World in Data (2018). file:///C:/Users/Sims/Documents/GSU/War%20and%20Peace%20%20Our%20World%20in%20Data.html
Oxford Living Dictionary. https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/civilization
Panizza, Diego (2013-2014). “Political Theory and Jurisprudence in Gentilie De Jure Belli: The
Great Debate between “Theological” and “humanist” Perspectives from Vitoria to
Grotius”. The Roots of International Law: Les Fondemonts Du Droit International:
Liber Amicorum. Peter Haggenmacher, Vincent Chetail, and Pierre-Marie Dupuy.
Leiden: Marinus Nijhoff.
Partain, Roy Andrew (2015). “A Comparative Legal Approach for the Risks of Offshore
Methane Hydrates: Existing Laws and Conventions.” Pace Environmental Law Review.
Summer 2015, Vol.32 (3) pp791-927.
“Peace and Security.” https://un.org

66

Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal and in the
Judgment of the Tribunal. Text adopted by the International Law Commission at its
second session, in 1950 and submitted to the General Assembly as part of the
Commission’s report covering the work of that session. The report, which also
contains commentaries on the principles, appears in yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 1950, vol. II, para. 97.
Proust, Mario and Paul Kingsley Clark (2006). “Unity, Diversity and the Fragmentation of
International Law: How Much Does the Multiplication of International Organizations
Really Matter?” Chinese Journal of International Law 2006, Vol. 5, (2) pp341-370.
Pufendorf, Samuel Von (1672). Of the Law of Nature and Nations, in Natural Law, Natural
Rights, and American Constitutionalism. www.nlnrac.org/earlymodern/law-ofnations/primary-source-documents/law-of-nature-and-nations
Putman, William H. and Jennifer R. Albright (2014). Legal Research, Analysis and Writing, 3rd
Edition. NY: Delmar Cengage Learning.
Raffo, Carlo and Alan Dyson (2007). “Full service extended schools and educational inequality
in urban contexts—new opportunities for progress?” Journal of Education Policy Vol.
22, 3, pp. 263-282.
Ramcharan, B. G. (2002). The Security Council and the Protection of Human
Rights. The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Kluwer Law International Netherlands.
Raustiala, Kal (2005). “The Evolution of Territoriality: International Relations and American
Law.” International Studies Review Vol 7, (3) Oct. 2005 pp 515-519. Also published in
Territoriality and Conflict in an Age of Globalization, Miles Kahler and Barbara Walter,
eds., Cambridge University Press 2006.
Reinicke, Wolfgang H., Frances M. Deng, Jan Martin Witte and Thorston Benner (2000).
Critical Choices: The United Nations, Networks and the Future of Global Governance.
http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/user_upload/media/pub/2000/Reinicke_Den g-2000Critical_Choices.pdf

Roche, D. (2003). The Human Right to Peace: Ethics and Policy. Middle Powers
Initiative. http://www.gsinstitute.org/docs/Rome03_Roche.pdf
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 1998. https://www.icccpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf
https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/add16852-aee9-4757-abe79cdc7cf02886/283503/romestatuteng1.pdf
“Rule of Law and Peace and Security”. https://un.org/ruleoflaw/rule-of-law-and-Peace-andsecurity/

67

Salcedo, Juan Antonio Carrillo (1997). Reflections on the Existence of a Hierarchy of Norms
in International Law, 8 EJIL 1997, http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/8/4/786.pdf Retrieved on
10/13/2010.
Sandler, Todd (2017). “International Peacekeeping Operations: Burden Sharing and
Effectiveness.”J.Conflict Res. Vol.61 (9)1875-1897.
Santiago Declaration on the human right to peace (10 December 2010). AEDIDH.
http://www.aedidh.org/?q=node/1853
Sayare, S. and Cowell, A. (03/03/2011). Libyan Refugee Crisis Called a ‘Logistical
Nightmare’. New York Times.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/world/africa/04refugee.html?ref
SC Resolution 827 (1993). ICTY. International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia.
SC Resolution 955 (1994). International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda.
SC/10200: Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly’ Zone over Libya…
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm
SC/10187: In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council Imposes Tough Measures on Libyan
Regime…26 February 2011. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10187.doc.htm
Scheffer, D. (2009). A Pragmatic Approach to Jurisdictional and Definitional Requirements for
the Crime of Aggression in the Rome Statute. Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law; Vol 41, 2/3, p. 397.
Scheffer, D. (7/1/2010). Aggression is Now a Crime. New York Times 7/1/2010.
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/02/opinion/o2iht-edscheffer.html?
Scott Shirley V. (2010). International Law in World Politics: An Introduction, 2nd Ed. Boulder:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
Shaffer, Gregory and Mark A. Pollack, in Dunoff, Jeffrey and Mark A. Pollack, Edit. (2013).
“Hard and Soft Power” in Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and
International Relations: The State of the Art. NY: Cambridge University Press. p. 197222.
Shaw, Malcolm (2005). International Law, 4th edit. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shinoda, H. (2001). Peace-building by the rule of law: An examination of intervention in the
form of international tribunals. Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University.
www.theglobalsite.ac.uk

68

Simmons, Beth (2009). Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics.
Cambridge University Press.
Slaughter, Anne Marie (1995). “International Law in a World of Liberal States”. IJIL 6:503.
Slaughter, Anne-Marie (1999-2000). “Judicial Globalization”. 40 Va.J.Int’ L. 1103.

Slaughter, Anne Marie (2004).
Sloan, James (2011). The Changed Nature of Peacekeeping. Portland, OR: Hart Publishing.
Sriram, C.L., Martin-Ortega, O. and Herman, J. (2009). War, Conflict, and Human Rights. New
York, NY: Routledge.
Sloss, D. (2006). Do International Norms Influence State Behavior? George Washington
International Law Review,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa5433/is_200601/ai_n21407335/pg_4
/?tag=content;col1 Retrieved 10/13/2010,
Slye, Ronald and Beth van Schaack (2010). International Criminal Law and Its Enforcement.
Thompson Reuters Foundation Press.
Solera, O. (2010). The Definition of the crime of Aggression: Lessons Not-Learned. Case
Western Reserve Journal of International Law Vol. 42:801.
http://www.case.edu/orgs/jil/vol.42.3/42_Solera.pdf
Spiro, Peter J. (2013). “Nongovernmental Organizations in International Relations (Theory).”
in Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The
State of the Art, Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack Editors. NY: Cambridge
University Press.
Stahn, Carsten (2006). “’Jus ad bellum’, ‘jus in bello’…’jus post bellum’? –Rethinking the
Conception of the Law of Armed Force”. European Journal of International Law,
Nov2006, Vol. 17 Issue 5, p921-943.
Stahn, Carsten (2008). “Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s)”. American University
International Law Review 23, p311-347.
Stewart, B. (2003). Review of The Human Right to Peace, by David Roche. Canada: Toronto.
Novalis. ISBN 2-89507-409-7 (2003). http://www.peace.ca/humanrighttopeace.htm
Retrieved on 10/13/2010.
Stiles, K. W. (2010). “international Organizations and Respect for International Law”. The
International Studies Encyclopedia. Denemark, Robert A. Blackwell Publishing,
2010. Blackwell Reference Online. 14 September 2010.

69

http://www.isacompendium.com/subscriber/tocnode?id=g9781444336597
_chunk_g978144433659711_ss1-42
Struett, M. J. (2008). The Politics of Constructing the International Criminal Court: NGOs,
Discourse, and Agency. NY: Palgrave MacMillan.

Tobruk, (February 23, 2011). Libya, CNN.
United Nations Charter. http://www.un.org
UNESCO http://www.culture-of-peace.info/history/introduction.html.
UNESCO: Global Movement for a culture of Peace. http://www.cultureofpeace.info/copoj/index.html;
http://www.unesco.org/cpp/uk/declarations/;
http://www.unesco.org/cpp/uk/projects/2000res.htm;
http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.phpURL_ID=3247&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html);
UNESCO: Notes from Commission V debate on Culture of Peace in 29th General
Conference. http://www.culture-of- peace.info/annexes/commissionV/summary.html
UNESCO: 2005 World Report on the Culture of Peace. http://decade-culture-ofpeace.org/2005report.html
UNGA A/51/395
UN GA A/RES/60/1 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly: 2005 World
Outcome. 24 October 2005.

Summit

UN GA Resolution 39/46: Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment of Punishment. 10 December 1984
United Nations. “Rule of Law and Peace and Security”. www.un.org/ruleoflaw/rule-of-law-andpeace-and-security/ Retrieved February 2018.
United Nations Office of High Commissioner of Human Rights. “The Core International Human
Rights Instruments and their monitoring bodies”.
http://ohchr.org/EN/Professionalinterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx Retrieved
3/5/2018.
UN Round Table on the Human Right to Peace. Current Concerns, The international journal for
independent thought, ethical standards, moral responsibility, and for the promotion and
respect of public international law, human rights and humanitarian law. No 6, 2007.
http://www.currentconcerns.ch/index.php?id=299 Retrieved on 10/13/2010.

70

Velasquez-Ruiz, Marco Alberto (2011). “In the Name of International Peace and Security:
Reflections on the United Nations Security Council’s Legislative Action”. Int. Law: Rev.
Colomb. Derecho Int. Bogotá (Columbia) No. 18:13-56, enero-junio de 2011.
Vermeer-Kunzli, Annemarieke 2008. “The Merits of Reasonable Flexibility: the Contribution
of the Law of Treaties to Peace” presented at the conference “Peace through Law: The
Role of the International Law Commission – A Colloquium at the Occasion of its Sixtieth
Anniversary” in Munich, July 2008. In Nolte, G. Ed. 2009, above.
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 1969.
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf
Von Stein, Jana (2010). “International Law: Understanding Compliance and Enforcement” in
Robert A Denemark (ed), The International Studies Encyclopedia (Wiley 2010).
Walt, Stephen (2017). “There’s Still No Reason to Think the Kellogg-Briand Pact
Accomplished Anything”. Foreign Policy Sept. 29, 2017.
Waltz, Kenneth. N. (1954,1959). Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis. NY:
Columbia University Press.
Weeramantry, Judge C. and John Burroughs 2005. “International Law and Peace: A Peace
Lesson”, A web-based part of Hague Appeal for Peace, Peace Lessons from Around the World,
http://www.haguepeace.org
http://www.haguepeace.org/files/morePeaceLessons/International%20Law%20and%20Peace%2
0(Weeramantry%20Sri%20Lanka%20and%20Buro ughts%20USA).pdf.
Weller, M. (2008). Peace Lost: The failure of conflict prevention in Kosovo. Leiden, The
Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP.
White, N.D. (1997). Keeping the Peace. UK: Manchester University Press.
Willimot, Haidi and Scott Sheeran (2013). “The protection of civilians mandate in UN
peacekeeping operations: reconciling protection concepts and practices.” Int’l Rev. of the
Red Cross 95, (891/892) 517-538.
World Summit Outcome. A/RES/60/1 2005.
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/generalassembly/docs/glob
alcompact/A_RES_60_1.pdf
Xenias, A. (2005). Reflection, Evaluation, Integration: Can a Global Peace Last Even If
Achieved? Huntington and the Democratic Peace. International Studies Review (2005)
7, 357-386. MA: Blackwell Publishing.

71

Yamoussoukro Declaration on Peace in the Minds of Men (1989).
http://www.unesco.org/cpp/uk/declarations/yamouss.pdf

72

